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Determined that both his shipmates and he resist the call of the Sirens, 
Ulysses employs two devices. He instructs his men to put wax in their ears and to 
tie him to the mast so that he can experience the temptation yet resist it.1 
Sometimes, though, it is not possible either to eliminate a temptation or to make it 
impossible to act on it. The modern literature on commitment highlights less 
constraining mechanisms that make a certain course of action less feasible or 
attractive without ruling it out altogether. A principal strategy is to enter into an 
arrangement in which one will suffer costs if one yields to temptation.2 For 
example, G. Terence Wilson describes weight-reduction programs in which 
“failure to meet predetermined goals may result in the client forfeiting a sum of 
money to his or her most disliked organization or political group.”3  
This Article describes what we call a “compensating commitment bond,” 
which is a variation on this type of commitment mechanism.4 An individual or 
entity that wishes to commit itself using a conventional forfeiture promise faces 
the following trade-off: Placing funds at risk increases the chance that the party 
will achieve some goal; there is a chance of failure, however, and the expected 
costs of this failure must be balanced against the benefit of the increased 
                                               
1 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY bk. XII 
2 JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND 
CONSTRAINTS 68-69 (2000). 
3 G. Terence Wilson, Behavior Therapy and the Treatment of Obesity, in THE ADDICTIVE 
BEHAVIORS 207, 218 (W.R. Miller ed., 1980). This approach and some similar commitment 
strategies are implemented in a website of which one of us is a cofounder. See 
http://www.stickk.com/faq.php#charities (last visited July 10, 2009) (noting that one can arrange 
to forfeit money either to a charity or to an “anti-charity”). That site, however, does not use or 
discuss the commitment bonds approach described here or provide any similar means for 
participants to receive an upfront benefit for agreeing to pay a cost if they should fail to reach their 
goals. Jon Elster describes this approach and one in which one receives a benefit for reaching a 
goal, but the benefit is received from money that a committing individual pays in advance, so the 
only difference from the costs scenario is whether the payment is made up front. ELSTER, supra 
note 2, at 70.  
4 We use the word “commitment” in place of what the literature often refers to as “pre-
commitment.” Jon Elster notes the terminological confusion: “In Ulysses and the Sirens I referred 
to this phenomenon as ‘precommitment’ or ‘self-binding.’ Others have used the terms 
‘commitment’ or ‘self-commitment.’” ELSTER, supra note 2, at 4. We use the term “commitment” 
to be as inclusive as possible. The word “precommitment” seems redundant, because all 
commitments by definition are promises concerning the future.  
 At times, we will refer to “compensating commitment bonds” simply as “commitment 
bonds,” in part because the concept of a bond already often denotes a financial instrument where 
the writer of the bond receives compensation. Distinguishing between compensating and non-
compensating commitments is useful because some have used the “commitment bond” term to 
refer to non-compensating commitments. See, e.g., Tim Harford, You Bet! My Commitment Bond 
Adventure, http://blogs.ft.com/undercover/2007/11/you-bet-my-comm.html/ (Nov. 13, 2007). 
 
 COMPENSATING COMMITMENTS   4 
 
 
likelihood of success. The cost of some desired degree of commitment thus might 
not be worth the benefit. In contrast, a compensating commitment bond provides 
the party entering into the commitment some benefit (either definite or 
contingent) for entering into that commitment, thus offsetting the risk of 
forfeiture. That is, instead of simply promising to forfeit money to a charity in the 
event of a failed commitment, the committing party sells the right to receive any 
forfeited funds to a third party. The commitment is a fair bet rather than a one-
way ratchet. 
This Article develops the concept of compensating commitment bonds for 
their potential use in a range of legal applications. For initial illustrative purposes, 
however, consider someone who aims to lose thirty pounds in a year. Suppose 
that there is a 10% chance that the person can reach this goal without any form of 
commitment, but the probability will increase to 40% if the individual has 
$10,000 at stake. With a conventional commitment, the person must decide 
whether a 30% increase in the probability of reaching the goal is worth putting 
$10,000 at risk. With a commitment bond, however, the person can sell to a third 
party the right to receive the $10,000 in the event of failure. Assuming symmetric 
information, a third party should be willing to pay almost $6,000 for the 60% 
chance of receiving $10,000.  
If the third party did pay $6,000, then the expected value to a risk neutral 
committing party would be zero, because the committing party would receive ex 
ante an amount equal to the expected cost of the forfeiture. In fact, the third party 
payment is likely to be less than $6,000, given that the third party is accepting the 
risk of any expected enforcement costs. Additionally, assuming that the 
committing party is somewhat risk-averse, the committing party bears a risk cost. 
Nonetheless, entering into the commitment may be considerably more attractive 
than it would be without commitment bonds. The cost of the commitment 
produced by the commitment bond is the amount that it costs to induce the third 
party to bear the risk (causing the payment to fall short of $6,000) plus the risk 
cost borne by the committing party. This is likely to be considerably less than the 
$10,000 at risk. 
Commitment bonds thus make commitment much more affordable, 
creating a range of applications that would otherwise be unattractive. 
Commitment bonds can help governments make credible policy. For instance, a 
government might use commitment bonds as a substitute for a constitutional 
balanced budget requirement by promising to compensate bondholders with $1 
for every dollar of budget deficit.5 Without the ex ante compensatory payment 
from the bondholders, it might be inadvisable for a government to take on this 
potential liability. The commitment benefit (assuming that there is a benefit from 
                                               
5 See infra Part II.C.1.a. 
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such a commitment) might not be worth the expected payment. A commitment 
bond could be just as effective a deterrent as an uncompensated commitment, but 
at lower expected cost. If the government meets its commitment, it comes out 
ahead, and this benefit largely offsets the cost of failure, especially for a relatively 
risk-neutral entity like a government.  
Our purpose is less to assess the strength of the normative case for any 
particular compensating commitment than to illustrate several classes of potential 
normative justifications for entering into compensating commitments. We will 
also consider applications of commitment bonds that illustrate their particular 
structural advantages and disadvantages. The balanced budget commitment is an 
example of a commitment bond that, like a constitutional provision but less 
strongly, seeks to ensure vindication of some high-order principle or preference. 
Commitments also might be used to send signals to third parties. For example, 
they can be used to assure holders of conventional bonds that inflation will be low 
or to facilitate political and legislative compromise. 
Another possible legal use of a commitment bond is to enhance an 
individual’s or entity’s attractiveness as a contracting party. Indeed, the literature 
has already explored this subset of compensating commitment bonds. Robert 
Cooter and Ariel Porat explain that “when the promisor and promisee affect the 
probability of nonperformance or the magnitude of the resulting loss, efficient 
incentives require each of them to bear 100 percent of the resulting harm.”6 The 
promisor, Cooter and Porat suggest, can promise to pay damages to a third party 
in the event some condition that is undesirable to the promisee occurs. This way, 
both parties have incentives to take care. Cooter and Porat call this “anti-
insurance” because the promisor agrees to make a payment to the anti-insurer in 
the event of some bad contingency instead of receiving a payment from an insurer 
to compensate for such a contingency.7 In our terminology, an individual may 
                                               
6 Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 204 (2002). 
7 One might extend the label “anti-insurance” to cover examples outside a contractual relationship. 
In some of our examples, including a simple weight loss contract, the label would make sense. The 
insured is receiving money instead of paying money, and then in the event of the bad contingency 
must pay money rather than receiving money. But there are other examples, even within the frame 
of contractual relationships considered by Cooter and Porat, in which the label makes less sense. 
For example, Cooter and Porat discuss the possibility of “anti-insurance for gains.” Id. at 218-21. 
“When the promisor and promisee affect the probability or magnitude of a gain,” they argue, 
“efficient incentives require each of them to bear 100 percent of the resulting gain.” Id. at 218. A 
lawyer and client who is a plaintiff in a litigation might pay a third party in exchange for the third 
party’s agreement to match the eventual recovery, so that the lawyer and client each receive 100% 
of the damages and thus each has optimal effort incentives. Here, the arrangement also differs 
from a standard insurance contract but in a different way; the insured makes an up-front payment 
for a right to receive money in the event of a good contingency. We prefer the label “commitment 
bonds” because it has applicability beyond contexts that seem related to insurance, and because 
the word “bond” emphasizes the purpose of the arrangement: that an individual or entity is seeking 
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usefully enter into a commitment bond as a contractual concession to another 
party. What Cooter and Porat do not consider is that commitment bonds may be 
useful outside of being a substitute for contractual provisions like warranties that 
would have undesirable incentive effects.8 Cooter and Porat’s focus on contracts 
leads them to overlook the possibility that a single party wanting to commit could 
beneficially sell a compensating commitment bond.9 They thus also do not 
recognize the possibility that government could use commitment bonds to achieve 
self-restraint. 
 This Article introduces and develops the concept and potential uses of 
commitment bonds. Part I.A describes single entity commitment bonds and 
explains the role of commitment bonds in signaling resolve while showing how 
the sale of such bonds may compensate the committing party for potential 
forfeitures arising out of the commitment. Part I.B then describes a family of 
incentive-equivalent bonds that vary the timing and contingency of cash flows 
and explains how auctioning commitment bonds creates the opportunity for the 
bonding process to aid in the process of goal setting itself.  
Part II considers single entity commitment bonds in the governmental 
context. Part II.A discusses whether the government can enter into commitment 
bonds as a legal matter, and Part II.B considers other challenges to commitment 
by the government, such as whether those commitments would be credible. Part 
II.C continues by discussing the functions of governmental commitment and 
examining specific examples where government commitment bonds may be 
useful. 
 Part III considers mutual commitment bonds, in which two or more parties 
individually agree to enter into a commitment bond with an external party. Mutual 
commitment bonds differ from single party bonds because each party is motivated 
to commit because it wants another party to constrain itself. Part III.A develops 
reasons for mutual commitment bonds, and Part III.B explores potential legal 
                                                                                                                                
to bind itself. Cooter and Porat’s focus on contractual contexts disguises the fact that the central 
aspect of an anti-insurance contract is that an individual or entity seeks or agrees to constrain 
itself. Our label reinforces that bonds are a mechanism by which a party can do so. 
8 The first sentence of Cooter and Porat’s paper reveals the contractual frame and motivation of 
their analysis: “Promises pose a dilemma for incentives.” Id. at 203. When Cooter and Porat 
compare anti-insurance to other legal devices, the comparison is to other tools of contract law. Id. 
at 223-25. Some of their conclusions are specific to the contractual context and might be different 
for other commitment bonds. For example, they argue, “Anti-insurance contracts are especially 
appropriate for one-shot transactions rather than for repeated interactions.” Id. at 215.  
9 Even Cooter and Porat’s formal model involves two contracting parties. They note, “At time 0, 
the anti-insurer gives (pa, pb) to A and B, respectively, where pa and pb are positive for anti-
insurance for losses and negative for anti-insurance for gains.” Id. at 230. They thus ignore the 
possibility in which pa or pb equals zero. 
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applications for mutual commitment bonds among private parties and among 
governments. 
I. SINGLE ENTITY COMMITMENT BONDS 
Far and away the most important aspect of compensating commitment 
bonds is the idea that the prospect of compensation for expected forfeitures 
radically reduces the cost of committing without reducing the incentive to follow 
through on the commitment. People have been using commitment devices for 
centuries to increase their own resolve or to credibly signal that resolve to others. 
The ability to achieve this while simultaneously being compensated for the 
expected forfeitures should by itself expand the demand for such devices. In this 
Part, we will describe a family of incentive-equivalent commitment bond 
implementations that vary the timing and contingency of the cash flows. We will 
focus on three implementations (which we call the ex ante, ex post, and wager 
implementations) that have particular salience. We will also describe the 
behavioral and structural factors that tend to make particular implementations 
more effective.  
We will also show that auctioning commitment bonds creates the 
opportunity for the bonding process to aid in the process of goal setting itself. 
Commitment bond auctions are a kind of market mechanism that generates third-
party assessments of the likelihood of commitment success. But instead of 
choosing the goal and the stakes and letting the subsequent auction reveal the 
probability of success, it is possible for the committing party to choose the goal 
and the desired probability of success. Then the committing party would let the 
market determine the minimum stakes that are required. Or, for goals that are 
susceptible to continuous variation (such as weight-loss or budget deficits or 
energy conservation), it is possible to choose the stakes and the desired 
probability of success and let the market choose the maximally obtainable goal. 
Commitment bond auctions can allow the market to signal to the committing 
party how best to set the stakes or even the commitment goal.  
A. Compensating Commitments 
1. A Family of Incentive-Equivalent Approaches 
In our earlier example, we imagined a weight-loss commitment bond 
where the committing party put $10,000 at risk if the party did not weigh thirty 
pounds less at the end of one year. Assuming that $10,000 stakes created a 40% 
chance of success and abstracting away from real-world transaction and 
enforcement costs as well as the time-value of money, potential counterparties 
should be willing to pay close to $6,000 to purchase the potential $10,000 
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forfeiture. The upfront payment of $6,000 is the expected forfeiture (60% x 
$10,000), and the exchange of the unconditional ex ante payment for the 
conditional ex post forfeiture makes the commitment bond a fair bet to both sides. 
We call this version of a commitment bond the ex ante implementation. 
But commitment bonds can be structured in other ways. For example, the 
committing party could put $10,000 at risk (promising to pay a counterparty this 
amount upon failing to keep the commitment), and counterparties would make 
offers of an amount that must be paid to the committing party ex post if the 
committing party succeeds in keeping the commitment. We call this version of a 
commitment bond the ex post implementation, because the committing party 
receives only the possibility of ex post compensation without any ex ante 
compensation. Because the counterparty must pay only if the committing party 
succeeds, the offers will generally be higher. For example, if the probability of 
success remained at 40%, counterparties should be willing to offer a contingent 
payment of $15,000 for success in exchange for the right to receive $10,000 for 
commitment failure (40% x $15,000 = 60% x $10,000).  
Below, we will focus on the behavioral impact of alternative commitment 
frames, but in the neoclassical model, the foregoing example produces a $25,000 
incentive for the committing party to keep her commitment. The committing party 
earns $15,000 if she succeeds and loses $10,000 if she fails, for a combined 
difference of $25,000. This larger incentive might well increase the probability of 
success and hence reduce the amount that counterparties would be willing to offer 
to below $15,000. It is possible, however, to derive an incentive-equivalent ex 
post implementation. If the committing party reduced her potential forfeiture to 
just $4,000, counterparties would be willing to offer $6,000 in ex post 
compensation. A counterparty should expect this amount of contingent 
compensation to produce a 40% of success, because the committing party, as with 
the ex ante implementation example, would have a total incentive of $10,000 (the 
$6,000 carrot plus the $4,000 stick). This ex post implementation would be a fair 
bet because a contingent payment of $6,000 would have the same expected value 
(40% x $6,000) as the contingent forfeiture of $4,000 (60% x $4,000).  
A surprising result (which we prove in a footnote10) is that for incentive-
equivalent implementations, the incentive-equivalent ex ante and ex post 
                                               
10 Let:  
EPF = ex post forfeiture if commitment failure 
 EPC = ex post compensation, if commitment success 
 I = EPC – EPF, equals total commitment incentive  
P = probability of success given level of incentive stakes 
EAC = ex ante compensation that bidder would be willing to bid if EPC = 0 and for 
chance to receive EPF. 
B = bid for right to S in event of failure (1 – P), where entire bid is paid ex ante 
 
 COMPENSATING COMMITMENTS   9 
 
 
compensations will be equal. In the above examples, counterparties will either 
pay $6,000 ex ante for a potential forfeiture of $10,000, or offer $6,000 ex post 
for a potential forfeiture of $4,000. For constant forfeiture amounts, the ex post 
compensation will always be greater than the ex ante compensation, because the 
ex post compensation needs to be paid only if the commitment is a success. But to 
maintain a constant commitment incentive, the forfeiture amount can be 
substantially lower with ex post compensation. It turns out the lower forfeiture 
amount exactly offsets the high ex post compensation effect. So, abstracting away 
from behavioral biases such as loss aversion, one would expect in the neo-
classical model that the present value of compensation would be the same for both 
the ex ante and ex post implementation.  
A problem with both these ex ante and ex post implementations is that 
third party bond holders may have difficulty collecting the forfeitures if the 
committing parties fail to keep their commitment. So far, we have varied the 
timing of the payment to the committing party, but we can also vary the timing of 
the payment from the committing party. A simple approach forces the committing 
party to pay an upfront deposit of any required forfeiture amount – the deposit 
being returned in full if the commitment is kept. Thus, instead of receiving $6,000 
in ex ante compensation in exchange for putting at risk $10,000 to be paid in the 
future, one could imagine being required to put $10,000 down as an ex ante 
deposit to make sure that the $10,000 forfeiture can actually be paid. On net, the 
committing party would pay $4,000 ex ante (placing a $10,000 deposit but 
receiving ex ante compensation of $6,000) and would receive the $10,000 deposit 
back if she succeeds (and nothing back if she fails). We call this version the 
wager implementation, because the timing of the cash flows closely resembles 
those of traditional bookie wagers. This approach is also incentive-equivalent: the 
                                                                                                                                
BC = bid for right to S in event of failure (1 – P), where bid is contingent and only paid in 
event of success, and 
I = total incentive. 
Using these it possible to derive that in a competitive equilibrium, the ex ante (unconditional) bid: 
B = S * (1-P). And since in the ex ante implementation I = S, we can restate the ex ante bid 
amount as  
B = I * (1 – P).       (1) 
In contrast, the ex post (conditional) bid amount in equilibrium should be such that the bidder’s 
probable cost of compensation equals the probable benefit of forfeiture: BC * P = S * (1 – P). For 
the ex post implementation we also know that the total commitment incentive will equal: I = BC + 
S, so S = I – BC. By substitution and manipulation, we have  
BC * P = (I – BC) * (1 – P) 
BC * P = I – BC – IP + BC*P 
BC = I – IP = I * (1 – P),     (2) 
which is equal to (1). 
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only difference from the ex ante approach is the deposit ensuring that the 
committing party will be able to meet its obligations. 
Table 1 summarizes the cash flows from these three implementations. All 
three are incentive-equivalent, because in each case the difference between the ex 
post compensation (which is contingent on success) and the ex post forfeiture 
(which is contingent on failure) is a constant $10,000. Moreover, each of these 
three implementations holds one of the three cash flows to zero: (1) the ex ante 
implementation has no ex post compensation and from an ex post perspective is 
purely a stick incentive; (2) the wager (or ex ante deposit) implementation has no 
ex post forfeiture and from an ex post perspective is purely a carrot incentive; and 
(3) the ex post implementation has no ex ante compensation and from an ex post 
perspective is a mixture of carrots and sticks. 
 
Table 1: An Example of the Family of Incentive-Equivalent Implementations 
 
Implementation 
Ex ante 
compensation 
Ex post 
compensation 
Ex post 
forfeiture 
Ex Ante  6,000 0 -10,000 
Ex Post  0 6,000 -4,000 
Wager  -4,000 10,000 0 
General 6,000 – K K K – 10,000 
 
The final row of Table 1 shows that these three implementations are 
special cases in a larger class of incentive-equivalent commitment bond 
implementations, all of which merely subtract some constant (K) from the ex ante 
compensation and add the same amount to both of the ex post cash flows. This 
generalization allows us not only to see the underlying links between the three 
core implementations, but also to generate additional incentive equivalent 
implementations where all three cash flows are non-zero. For example, setting K 
equal to $3,000 constructs a scenario where counterparties pay $3,000 in ex ante 
compensation to receive the chance to win $7,000 in ex post forfeiture but take on 
the obligation to pay an additional $3,000 in ex post compensation if the 
committing party succeeds. As we’ll soon argue, this larger family of incentive-
equivalent implementations is more than a theoretical curiosity. In a world with 
liquidity constraints and cognitive biases, it gives policy makers a richer toolbox 
of instruments from which to choose. 
 The above examples hold the incentive constant at $10,000 and assumes 
that this incentive, regardless of whether it is implemented through carrots or 
sticks, produces a constant probability of success of 40%. More generally within 
the neoclassical model, we could define the total commitment incentive, I, to be: 
 I = EPC – EPF 
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where EPC is the ex post compensation (which is contingent on success) and EPF 
is the ex post forfeiture (which is contingent on failure). Then if we let P(I) be the 
probability of commitment success given a commitment incentive, then the 
expected forfeiture from the ex ante implementation, EF, for any particular I will 
be: 
 EF = (1 – P(I))*I. 
With these definitions, Table 2 reports a more general statement of the 
family of incentive-equivalent commitments. For example, if a $20,000 incentive 
produced a 75% probability of success, then I = $20,000 and EF = $5,000. So we 
could expect a counterparty to pay close to $5,000 in ex ante compensation for the 
chance to receive a $20,000 forfeiture. Alternatively, counterparties would offer 
up to $5,000 in ex post compensation for the chance to receive a $15,000 
forfeiture. Or, the committing party would put down $15,000 ex ante and receive 
$20,000 from counterparties in the event of success. All of the implementations, 
including the more general K-constant implementations, are fair bets, because the 
expected compensation from the counterparty equals the expected forfeiture to the 
counterparty.11 
  
Table 2: A General Description of Outcomes for a Family of Incentive- 
Equivalent Implementations 
 
Implementations 
Ex ante 
compensation 
Ex post 
compensation 
Ex post 
forfeiture 
Ex Ante  EF 0 -I 
Ex Post  0 EF EF – I 
Wager EF - I I 0 
General EF – K K K – I 
 
2. A Behavioral Comparison 
While the family of implementations described in Table 2 is somewhat 
redundant in a stylized world without transaction or enforcement costs or 
cognitive biases, different implementations can produce different results when we 
move away from these assumptions. For example, as mentioned above, difficulty 
in enforcing ex post forfeitures will drive the parties toward the wager 
implementation. Conversely, the ex ante implementation will be favored in 
                                               
11 From the general, K-constant, implementation we can see that the expected a bidder’s expected 
payments and receipts would be: EF – K + PK + (1 – P)(K – I) = 0. 
Substituting EF = (1 – P)I, we have 
(1 – P)I – K + PK + K – PK – (1 – P)I = 0, 
 where the left-side simplifies to 0, indicating that the cash flows are a fair bet. 
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circumstances where the committing party is concerned that the counterparty will 
not pay the ex post compensation if there is commitment success. The ex post 
implementation (as one in a range of constant-K implementations) splits the 
difference – placing some risk of enforcement on both the counterparty and the 
committing party. 
Alternatively, if the question is not one of enforcement but of liquidity, 
then we can again see nonequivalence among the implementations. In the 
foregoing example, where a $10,000 incentive produced a 40% chance of success, 
if the committing party has only $5,000, then the ex ante implementation (with its 
potential $10,000 forfeiture) would be infeasible, whereas the ex post 
implementation (with its $4,000 forfeiture) or the wage implementation (with its 
$4,000 ex ante deposit) would be feasible.12 Or, if the counterparties are liquidity 
constrained, then the wager implementation (which in the foregoing example 
requires a potential $10,000 ex post compensation) is less feasible than the ex ante 
or ex post implementations (which require only $6,000 payments) to support the 
same incentive amount. 
The picture becomes even more interesting if committing parties exhibit 
cognitive deviations from traditional expected utility theory. For example, if the 
committing party exhibits loss aversion,13 then committing parties will work 
harder to avoid failure when incentives are framed as contingent punishments 
(sticks) than as contingent rewards (carrots). Returning to the numeric example in 
Table 1 (and assuming for now that counterparties do not adjust their offers in 
anticipation of cognitive effects), it is easy to rank the three core implementations 
in terms of predicted incentive effects if we ignore the sunk ex ante compensation 
or payments and focus solely on the ex post contingent cash flows. From this ex 
post perspective, the ex ante implementation will produce the greatest incentive 
effect because it uses the largest stick of $10,000. The ex post compensation 
produces the second largest incentive because it combines a $6,000 carrot with a 
$4,000 stick. The wager implementation produces the smallest loss aversion and 
thus the smallest incentive because it relies solely on a $10,000 carrot to induce 
compliance. 
However, our earlier emphasis that the wager implementation is identical 
to the ex ante compensation implementation coupled with a $10,000 deposit is a 
clue that the ex ante lump sum payments may play a crucial role in whether the ex 
post cash flows are treated as gains or losses. Suppose that the committing party 
                                               
12 Indeed any constant K implementation for $5,000 < K < $11,000 would be feasible given the 
$5,000 liquidity constraint. 
13 See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A 
Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (1991) (exploring the evidence for and 
consequences of losses having greater impact than gains). 
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treats gains and losses equivalently, but suffers from a sunk cost fallacy.14 A 
committing party who starts off paying $4,000 under the wager implementation 
may work harder to avoid losing this money for good. Meanwhile, just as 
gamblers who get ahead in their initial bets show a great willingness to play with 
“house money,” committing parties who start off with a $6,000 payment may treat 
the prospect of forfeiting $10,000 as really just a $4,000 net loss. Thus, if we 
imagine that parties count sunk costs (and do not deduct them from possible 
gains) and ignore already received benefits (deducting them from possible losses), 
then the wager implementation produces the largest incentive effect, and the ex 
ante version produces the smallest. 
The loss aversion dominance of the wager implementation over the ex 
ante implementation on these assumptions should impact the amount that 
counterparties are willing to offer to the extent that counterparties believe that 
committing parties “suffer” from loss aversion. For example, if the presence of 
the initial $6,000 payment makes the ex ante implementation feel like only a 
$4,000 incentive, counterparties might expect a lower probability of success. 
They would then be willing to offer even more than $6,000 for the chance to earn 
$10,000. Under this reasoning, a $7,000 or $8,000 initial payment would further 
undermine the perceived incentive effect. But rather than complete unraveling, in 
equilibrium we would ordinarily expect inflated payments that still allowed for 
some probability of success. While it is tempting to think of these higher ex ante 
bids as a good thing, they are driven by a market assessment that the commitment 
device would have a lower probability of being effective. 
Another relevant behavioral possibility is that hyperbolic discounting 
might lead committing parties to have time-inconsistent preferences.15 (For 
simplicity, we have so far ignored standard discounting, though it would be 
straightforward to adjust the payments for the time value of money.) Hyperbolic 
discounting causes people to exhibit “present bias” because they sharply discount 
any cash flows that are received in the future, regardless of how far in the future 
they are received. For example, behavioral economists Ted O’Donoghue and Matt 
Rabin make an extreme, but simplifying, assumption that hyperbolic discounters 
cut the value of any future reward in half – whether it is 1 or 100 weeks in the 
future.16 Under this assumption, a committing party who is a hyperbolic 
                                               
14 See generally Thomas Kelly, Sunk Costs, Rationality, and Acting for the Sake of the Past, 38 
NOÛS 60 (2004) (exploring the sunk cost fallacy and arguing that honoring sunk costs is 
sometimes rational). 
15 See, e.g., Fernando S. Machado & Rajiv K. Sinha, Smoking Cessation: A Model of Planned vs. 
Actual Behavior for Time-Inconsistent Consumers, 26 MKTG. SCI. 834 (2007) (exploring the 
implications of hyperbolic discounting and time inconsistency among smokers). 
16 Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1825 (2006). 
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discounter would experience the three core implementations described in Table 1 
as if they produced the following cash flows: 
 
Table 3. Possible effects of hyperbolic discounting 
 
Implementation 
Ex ante 
compensation 
Ex post 
compensation 
Ex post forfeiture 
Ex Ante $6,000 0 -$5,000 
Ex Post 0 $3,000 -$2,000 
Wager -$4,000 $5,000 0 
General $6,000 – K K/2 K/2 - $5,000 
 
This table shows that hyperbolic discounting is likely to push toward 
favoring the ex ante implementation. A hyperbolic discounter “feels” the full 
benefit of a $6,000 compensation for what, from the ex ante perspective, feels like 
putting $5,000 at risk. In contrast, the ex post implementation equally discounts 
the carrot and the stick, producing less attractive implicit odds, while the 
experience of odds of the wager are worst because the hyperbolic discounter is 
forced to deposit $4,000 ex ante for the chance to receive what “feels” like a 
chance at $5,000. 
Indeed, the ex ante implementation flips one of the core results of the 
hyperbolic discounting literature. Writers have suggested that the most severe 
barrier to entering into commitments is that hyperbolic discounters must be 
sophisticated enough to know that they have a problem.17 For example, a naïve 
hyperbolic discounter who puts off an unpleasant task (a cost) today, but 
nonetheless believes that she will not put it off in the future, may not feel like she 
needs help strengthening resolve. She believes (incorrectly) that she will stop 
procrastinating all by herself. Under this theory, naïve hyperbolic discounters are 
unlikely to demand commitments to increase their resolve: They procrastinate 
now, but they do not think they will have a problem with procrastination in the 
future. 
 But ex ante implementations flip the impact of naïveté. Because the naïf 
does not think that she will have a weakness of will in the second period, she will 
overestimate the objective probability of success. For a naïve hyperbolic 
discounter, the market’s proffered ex ante payment will seem overly generous, 
both because it is an immediate payment and because it is in return for what a 
naïve hyperbolic discounter will think is a very low probability of forfeiture. 
However, the prospect of this future forfeiture will nonetheless have an impact in 
                                               
17 See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber & Botond Köszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence, 
116 Q.J. ECON. 1261, 1279 (2001) (labeling a subset of hyperbolic discounters as “naïve” because 
“they do not understand that they cannot make consistent plans through time”). 
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raising success rates as the time horizon shrinks and the committing party comes 
closer to the time of potential forfeiture, when the potential loss is no longer 
discounted. What initially felt like just a potential $5,000 loss will blossom into a 
potential $10,000 forfeiture as time elapses and the future becomes the present.  
The naïve hyperbolic discounter will consider the proffered compensation 
from an ex ante implementation to be better than a fair bet. In essence, as long as 
the counterparties offering compensation are more sophisticated than the 
committing party in their knowledge of the committing party’s likely continuing 
willpower problem, the proceeds of the commitment bond will seem beneficent. 
The counterparties’ heightened sophistication can substitute for the committing 
party’s lack of sophistication. O’Donoghue and Rabin argue that most humans 
“exhibit a tendency to pursue immediate gratification in a way that they 
themselves disapprove of in the long run.”18 But ex ante implementations harness 
this urge to pursue immediate gratification to encourage participation in taking on 
longer term commitment risks. 
B. Commitment Auctions 
One way to effectuate compensating commitment bonds would be to use 
an auction. Specifically, counterparties would serve as bidders, and the highest 
bidder would win the right to receive any future forfeit of the committing party. 
As we will discuss, such an auction mechanism (in all three implementations) 
both has informational benefits and creates the opportunity for the bonding 
process to aid in the process of goal setting itself. 
1. Informational Benefits 
Aside from providing a means for committing parties to solicit offers of 
compensation from counterparties, auctions provide an independent benefit in 
potentially providing the committing parties with information that can make them 
more sophisticated. All of the implementations – including the auctions that 
would pay ex post compensation – have ex ante determinations of contractual 
terms from which the implicit probability of success can be determined. For 
example, imagine an ex post compensation auction where the high bidder offers 
to pay $70 contingent on commitment success in exchange for a chance to earn 
$100 if the commitment fails. From this winning bid, we can infer that the market 
measures the probability of success to be 58.8%.19  
                                               
18 O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 16, at 1828. 
19 58.8% = 1 – (70/170). More generally, the implicit probability from any of the incentive-
equivalent implementations will be 1 – ((EAC + PV(EPC))/(PV(EPC-EPF))), where EAC, EPC 
and EPF are defined as before, see supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., and PV() is the 
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The ability to back out implicit success probabilities ranging from 0% to 
100% also underscores a key design choice in setting the size of forfeiture 
amounts. In the terms of Calabresi and Melamed,20 commitment bonds can be 
structured as either liability or property rules. Property rule commitments would 
have more severe forfeitures that would produce implicit success probabilities 
closer to 100%. The purpose of property rule commitments would be to deter 
future failure by taking choice off the table. Liability rule commitments, in 
contrast, would seek to guide future choice by forcing the committing party’s 
future self to internalize external impacts of failing to keep a commitment. With 
liability rule commitments, the implicit success could be substantially lower, 
albeit still higher than it would be in the absence of the forfeiture incentive. 
While theory suggests that the implicit probability of success should 
generally increase as the amount at risk to be forfeited increases, the amount of 
expected compensation can either increase or decrease as the amount at risk to be 
forfeited increases. This relationship depends on the elasticity of the probability of 
forfeiture with regard to size of the stakes. If the probability of forfeiture is 
inelastic with respect to changes in stakes, then increases in the forfeiture amount 
will tend to increase the offered ex ante compensation.21 Counterparty bidders will 
                                                                                                                                
present value at time of auction of future cash flows. 
20 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability; 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); see also IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: 
THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005);  
21 In an ex ante compensation auction, the ex ante compensation from a commitment as a function 
of the ex post forfeiture is: 
 EAC(EPF) = P(EPF)*EPF, 
Where EAC() = ex ante compensation, 
 EPF = ex post forfeiture at risk, and 
 P(EPF) = probability of forfeiture of stakes give EPF. 
Using the trusty tools of introductory economics, we can minimize the expected Forfeiture by 
finding the stakes that make: 
 dEAC/dEPF = P(EPF) + (dP/dEPF)*EPF = 0   (1) 
which can be restated as: 
 P/EPF = -dP/dEPF.      (2) 
If we assume that people will work harder to keep their commitment when the stakes are 
increased, then dP/dS is likely to be less than zero. Equation (2) implies that the ex ante 
compensation on a commitment contract will be minimized when: 
 -(dP/dEPF)/(P/EPF) = e = 1 
where e is the elasticity of the probability of forfeiture with respect to the stakes. As long as the 
probability of forfeiture is elastic, the ex ante compensation will decrease with increases in the size 
of the forfeiture amount. Or to put it slightly more simply, so long as the percentage reduction in P 
is greater than the percentage increase in EPF, ex ante compensation will increase with reduction 
in stakes. For sufficiently high stakes if the probability of forfeiture remains greater than 0, there 
are good reasons to assume that the responsiveness of the probability will become inelastic, so that 
the ex ante compensation will begin to increase with the forfeiture amount.  
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pay more for a greater potential forfeit reward. But if the probability of forfeiture 
is sufficiently elastic with respect to an increase in the stakes, then increasing the 
forfeiture amount will decrease the ex ante compensation. The reduced 
probability of a forfeiture in this case more than compensates for its increased 
size.22 
A committing party who naively overestimates the probability of success 
would need to confront bidders’ skepticism (evidenced by bidders’ willingness to 
offer large ex ante compensation). Market feedback indicating that willpower 
problems may extend into the future might itself improve the committing party’s 
sophistication. This ex ante information might help committing parties change 
their behavior. A committing party who learns that the implicit probability of 
success is too low might react by raising the stakes to increase the probability of 
success. 
2. Goal Setting Auctions 
Instead of backing out an implicit probability of success for a pre-
specified goal, it is possible to structure commitment auctions over goal-setting 
itself in order to achieve pre-specified probabilities of success. For example, with 
regard to weight loss, it is well established in the literature that dieters have a 
tendency to set unrealistically large weight loss goals.23 In our earlier 
implementations, the auction contract specified the goal (for example, the number 
of pounds the party intends to lose by some date) and two of three cashflows (ex 
ante compensation, ex post compensation, or ex post forfeiture). The auction 
would then be conducted on the unspecified cashflow to find the bidder that was 
willing to offer the most advantageous term on this dimension. 
In contrast, under a goal-setting auction, the committing party would set 
all three cashflows and would then allow bidders to compete on who would offer 
the most easily achieved goal. Pre-specifying the three cashflows would mean 
implicitly specifying the required probability of success. The auction bids would 
then determine the goal that would produce that requisite probability. For 
example, imagine that a 250-pound Rush specified $1,000,000 as an ex post 
forfeiture, $0 as ex post compensation, and $400,000 as ex ante compensation in a 
                                               
22 In ongoing commitments with the possibility of multiple forfeitures or forfeitures of different 
amounts, it will not be possible to back out a single probability of success.  
23 Most obese people want to lose a lot more than a realistic 10% of their body weight. A 1997 
study of obese dieters found that most wanted to lose more than 30% of their initial weight. Gary 
D. Foster et al., What Is a Reasonable Weight Loss? Patients’ Expectations and Evaluations of 
Obesity Treatment Outcomes, 65 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 79 (1997). The National 
Institute of Health recommends an initial goal of no more than 10%. NIH, Guidelines on 
Overweight and Obesity: Electronic Textbook, 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/e_txtbk/txgd/4311.htm. 
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commitment contract for him to lose X pounds by the end of the year. The pre-
specified cash flows would be a fair bet if Rush had a 60% of losing X pounds. He 
could hold a Dutch auction where bidders competed by offering successively 
lower X’s.24 The bidder offering the lowest X, the most easily achieved weight-
loss goal, would win the auction and be obligated to pay the $400,000 in ex ante 
compensation.  
As in other contexts, it would be possible for the committing party to 
include a “reserve price” for the auction. For example, if it would not be healthy 
to lose more than 100 lbs, the initial auction could specify that the initial bids had 
to be less than that amount. Not all contexts are equally amenable to goal-setting 
auctions. Some commitments by their nature are all-or-nothing affairs. For 
example, commitments to quit smoking or to do your taxes on time are not as 
divisible as a weight-loss commitment. Even smoking cessation commitments, 
however, might be differentiated by number of cigarettes a day or the speed to 
cessation.  
It is also possible to use auctions to help choose the most effective 
forfeiture amount. Instead of specifying the three cash-flows and having the 
bidders compete in offering the most advantageous goal to the committing party, 
it is possible for the committing party to specify the goal and the desired ratio of 
compensation to forfeiture and then have bidders compete on the minimum 
forfeiture that will produce the desired probability of success. For example, 
imagine that Barack wants to enter into a commitment contract to quit smoking by 
the end of the year and wants to have at least a 75% chance of success. He could 
auction a commitment to quit smoking where he promises as a contingent 
forfeiture to pay four times the amount of any ex ante compensation. The bidders 
would then compete by entering successively higher offers of ex ante 
compensation. For example, if Barack would have a 75% chance of success with 
$1,000,000 at risk, then a competitive auction would produce bids of ex ante 
compensation close to $250,000.25 
Stepping back, we have shown not only that compensating commitment 
bonds radically reduce the price of making credible commitments, but also that 
commitment auctions can be implemented in a bewildering array of incentive-
                                               
24 The auction equally could be conducted as a silent auction, with the bidder offering the lowest X 
announced as the winner when the bids are revealed. The contract would then be for that value of 
X, or alternative for the second-lowest value of X. This would make the auction akin to a Vickrey 
second-price auction, which induces bidders to make the most favorable bids that they would be 
willing to accept. See William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed 
Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8 (1971). 
25 An analogous commitment auction was proposed to privatize the setting of bail bonds to assure 
that defendants had a sufficient probability of showing up for their trial. See Ian Ayres & Joel 
Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987 (1994).  
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equivalent ways that would allow committing parties to respond to a variety of 
cognitive, liquidity and information barriers. The case for compensating 
commitment contracts is strengthened by considering things like time-inconsistent 
preferences and naïve, self-serving bias. Moreover, the market dimension of these 
auctions can be harnessed to help committing parties choose more realistic goals 
or more effective stakes. 
II. COMMITMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT 
Our discussion so far has focused on use of commitment bonds by single-
entity private parties. We now consider the government as an example of such an 
entity. We begin by considering whether the government may sell compensating 
commitment bonds. In the United States, existing law is ambiguous, but there are 
strong arguments for enforcing commitment bonds in at least some instances. We 
then consider various possible uses of commitment bonds. Although we 
sometimes use the U.S. case as an example, these uses could easily be adopted in 
other countries as well if compensating commitment bonds are permissible under 
their laws. We identify three classes of potential uses of commitment bonds: to 
ensure continued commitment to broad principles, to signal third parties to affect 
their behavior, and to facilitate political compromise. 
A. The Legal Status of Governmental Commitment Bonds 
Most of the analysis in this Article is applicable to any country or 
government, but here we focus specifically on the United States. We find no clear 
answer in the existing legal literature or case law as to whether the federal 
government may use compensating commitment bonds; indeed, if there were such 
an answer, the originality of this Article might well be called into question. 
Nonetheless, we argue that there may well be normatively attractive reasons for 
the government to enter into commitments, and that at least when these reasons 
are applicable, this should factor into any judicial analysis of commitment bonds.  
Assuming that legislatures are generally not allowed to entrench their 
decisions and that indirect attempts to entrench may be constitutionally 
problematic, we believe that courts might enforce governmental issuance of 
commitment bonds, subject to the restriction that the bonds are consistent with 
legitimate means and legitimate ends. First, with regard to legitimate means, the 
commitment must be sufficiently weak so that there remains a reasonable 
probability that the government will fail to meet its commitment. The 
commitment bond might legitimately force future government decisionmakers to 
internalize the true cost of their decisions in making a future decision, but it 
should not take the decision off the table. In the terms of Calabresi and 
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Melamed,26 government bonds should implement liability rules and not property 
rules. Second, with respect to legitimate ends, government commitment needs to 
be motivated primarily as an effort to attain a legitimate goal. This would 
preclude the government from using commitment bonds to encourage ends that it 
could not insist on directly (for example, because those ends are unconstitutional). 
It would also prevent the government from issuing commitment bonds solely to 
preserve political victories, absent some sufficiently persuasive neutral reason for 
entrenchment. 
Proceeding on the assumption that the government at least sometimes can 
enter into commitment bonds, we explore some potentially legitimate reasons for 
the government to enter into commitment bonds. Some of these reasons for 
allowing government commitments—allowing legislators to commit to higher-
order principles that it otherwise would not have the fortitude to keep and 
signaling third parties about the government’s intentions—are direct parallels of 
the motivations for commitment bonds more generally. Another reason, 
facilitation of political compromise, is more specific to the legislative process. 
1. The Ambiguity of Existing Law 
A complete analysis of the permissibility of commitment bonds under U.S. 
law is beyond our scope, though we hope to identify the basic arguments on both 
sides and to suggest that normative factors might well influence legislative 
decisions about whether to enter into commitment bonds and judicial decisions 
about whether to enforce them. Commitment bonds may be legal if either (a) the 
Congress in general may pass a law that prevents a subsequent Congress from 
overturning it by a simple majority vote; (b) Congress cannot do so, but can take 
any other action within its enumerated powers that may as a practical matter have 
the effect of indirectly constraining future Congresses; or (c) Congress can only 
take some actions that may constrain future Congresses, but commitment bonds 
are among the actions that it is permissible for Congress to take. 
In 2002, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule argued that one Congress could 
entrench a later Congress.27 They suggested a number of reasons that 
entrenchment might be normatively beneficial,28 including that entrenchment may 
allow the government to obtain better terms in dealings with third parties29 and 
that commitment enhances legislative predictability.30 They argue that the 
                                               
26 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
27 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1665 (2002). 
28 Id. at 1670-73. 
29 Id. at 1671. 
30 Id. at 1672. 
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constitutional text does not prevent entrenchment,31 and that history supports its 
use.32 John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport counter these arguments, 
maintaining that although the Constitution may entrench itself against 
amendment, legislation cannot do so.33 Perhaps their most powerful argument is 
that it was commonly believed at the Founding that legislators could not entrench 
themselves,34 and that the Antifederalists could have been expected to object if the 
Constitution were understood as deviating from this understanding. Stewart Sterk 
also counters Posner and Vermeule’s normative arguments, emphasizing that if 
legislators have imperfect foresight, the entrenchment tool may do more harm 
than good.35 
All of these commentators, however, acknowledge that one Congress can 
constrain a later Congress to a great extent through its decisions, particularly 
through decisions to enter into contracts. For example, Posner and Vermeule 
emphasize that “[a] government contract, like an entrenching statute, imposes a 
cost—albeit fiscal rather than political—on future legislatures that seek to escape 
the consequences of the earlier action.”36 Sterk also notes that it is permissible for 
government to enter into contracts, though he notes that this may be justified in 
part by the fact that “[b]uilt into contract law is a significant safety valve: the 
parties to the contract can always renegotiate.”37 McGinnis and Rappaport, 
meanwhile, view government contracts as an exception to the general anti-
entrenchment rule,38 and they note that “[t]he strongest case for . . . entrenchment 
of public contracts is for debt contracts,”39 because they lower the cost of 
government borrowing. They note, however, that “debt contracts present a serious 
problem” because “government agents will sometimes use this borrowing 
authority to shift onto future generations the costs of spending that benefits only 
the present generation.”40  
McGinnis and Rappaport further note that this exception may be justified 
only because “the traditional constitutional rule that emerged during the 
nineteenth century . . . strongly presumed that governments cannot contract away 
                                               
31 Id. at 1674-78. 
32 Id. at 1678-80. 
33 See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional 
Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003). 
34 Id. at 390-96. 
35 Stewart E. Sterk, Retrenchment on Entrenchment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 231, 240-44 (2003). 
36 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 1701. 
37 Id. at 242-43.  
38 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 33, at 434-36. 
39 Id. at 435. 
40 Id. 
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their sovereign powers.”41 More recent Supreme Court case law, however, treats 
the sovereign acts doctrine narrowly. For example, in United States v. Winstar 
Corp.,42 the Court rejected a claim that the United States could escape contractual 
obligations to financial institutions on account of a legal change. The Court 
acknowledged that a “public and general” act of the sovereign could support the 
government in seeking discharge of a contractual obligation.43 In general, “that 
defense is traditionally unavailable where the barrier to performance arises from 
the act of the party seeking discharge,”44 but this general rule does not apply when 
the government acting as sovereign can be distinguished from the government 
acting as contractor.45  
In Winstar, the government could not escape liability because the statute 
was attributed to the government acting as contractor.46 More importantly, for 
present purposes, the Court announced a clear “holding,” “that a governmental act 
will not be public and general if it has the substantial effect of releasing the 
Government from its contractual obligations.”47 Importantly, the Court never even 
considers the argument that the contract should be invalidated because it might 
constrain a later Congress (such as the one that in fact enacted legislation that led 
to large contractual obligations). If the Court were concerned about contracts 
unduly entrenching government policy, then it would be logical to say that the 
more central the contractual obligations are to a government policy, the stronger 
the case that the contract must yield to policy. The Court adopts precisely the 
reverse distinction, limiting liability to situations in which the sovereign adopts a 
general law that indirectly affects contracting parties.  
Admittedly, this does not allow a decisive prediction of how the Court 
might treat a compensating commitment bond. Perhaps a case involving a 
commitment bond would lead the Court to shift the analysis from a determination 
of what capacity the government has acted in to an inquiry into whether contracts 
unduly interfere with government policymaking. The strongest argument for 
barring commitment bonds—or more plausibly, for finding unconstitutional some 
subset of commitment bonds—is that they do not serve the typical functions of 
contracts and are expressly intended to contract away a nation’s sovereign 
                                               
41 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 33, at 436. 
42 518 U.S. 839 (1996). 
43 Id. at 895 (citing Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925)). 
44 Id. at 895. 
45 Id. at 895-96. 
46 An interesting hypothetical is whether the government could have escaped liability if it 
explicitly extinguished its contractual obligations in the new statute. See infra note 60 (discussing 
analogous issues for commitment bonds). 
47 518 U.S. at 899. 
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powers, or at least to constrain future governmental action. Whether the Court 
would find this problematic presumably depends in part on the normative case for 
allowing entrenchment with commitment bonds. We now turn to a brief 
normative evaluation, including an analysis of potential limits on commitment 
bonds that would alleviate entrenchment concerns. 
2. A Normative Evaluation 
Government commitment bonds would be most problematic if used to 
attempt to accomplish indirectly what the legislature could not constitutionally 
compel directly. For example, imagine that a commitment bond provided for a 
trillion dollar payment to the bondholders if a woman were ever elected President 
of the United States. A legislative provision declaring women ineligible for the 
Presidency would be unconstitutional.48 Yet this commitment bond, while not 
foreclosing the possibility altogether, might make it considerably more difficult 
for a woman to ascend to the Presidency. An old principle of constitutional 
interpretation is that the legislature cannot accomplish indirectly what it is 
prohibited from accomplishing directly.49 This principle is not taken as seriously 
today,50 however, and commentators routinely label the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on the related unconstitutional conditions doctrine incoherent.51 
Nonetheless, we believe that the Supreme Court would find some basis for 
finding such a commitment bond unconstitutional.  
The more difficult case is the determination of whether entrenchment 
through commitment bonds can be unconstitutional when there is no specific 
constitutional concern other than with the entrenchment itself. The case for 
unconstitutionality is likely to be strongest when the only purpose behind a 
commitment bond is to entrench a current majority over a current minority. For 
example, we might imagine that a narrow Republican minority might use 
commitment bonds to entrench the Contract with America, or that a narrow 
Democratic majority might use commitment bonds to entrench a health care 
reform plan. There may not be any obvious textual basis for striking down such a 
                                               
48 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 33, at 403. 
49 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 527 (1856) (“Congress cannot do indirectly what 
the Constitution prohibits directly.”). 
50 See Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of 
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989, 994 (1995) (stating that the “rhetoric of ‘the 
government cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly’ was poppycock if taken seriously”).  
51 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term: Unconstitutional Conditions, 
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5, 103 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Why 
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to 
Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990). 
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statute,52 but suspect that the Supreme Court might find some means of striking 
down uses of commitment bonds that have no purposes other than to entrench 
temporary majorities, for example by holding that the commitment bonds are 
inconsistent with the structure of the Constitution.53 
Even in these cases, however, defenders of entrenchment may offer an 
apolitical reason for entrenchment: that they wish to assure citizens that they can 
rely on the continuation of the program. For example, Republicans could defend a 
provision of the Contract with America repealing the marriage penalty54 by 
arguing that they can better assure citizens that marriage will not reduce their tax 
penalty if they can make the change irreversible. And Democrats could entrench a 
public option in a health care reform bill by insisting that individuals might be 
hesitant to abandon their private insurance plans for a public plan if there were a 
chance that the public plan might be abolished and they would no longer have 
guaranteed continuing coverage from their private plan. It seems likely that one 
could make arguments along these line, some stronger and some weaker, for 
virtually any entrenching legislation, whether they are the true motives or not. 
Legislators could also simply argue that they believe that the government will 
benefit because the commitment bonds will provide revenue that government 
officials do not believe they will have to repay. And in many cases, legislators 
could claim other apolitical motives for entrenchment, some of which we will 
consider below.55  
The courts thus have several options. The first is to prohibit all 
governmental issuance of commitment bonds, and the second is to allow all such 
use, at least absent constitutional concerns other than entrenchment. The third is 
to limit commitment bonds, allowing them in some cases but not in others. There 
are several possible approaches that the courts could take in separating 
permissible from impermissible commitment bonds. 
One approach to limit commitment bonds would be for the courts to try to 
determine whether the claimed motive is the true motive. Identifying legislative 
                                               
52 One possibility is that the courts might hold that some entrenchments violate Article V.  See 
U.S. CONST. art. V (providing the process for amendment of the Constitution). The argument 
might be either that a commitment bond provides effectively unrepealable legislation without the 
safeguards of Article V, or that a commitment bond could discourage use of the constitutional 
amendment process if a proposed amendment might lead to payout of a bond.  
53 Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (“Because there is no constitutional text 
speaking to this precise question, the answer to the [plaintiffs’] challenge must be sought in 
historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence 
of this Court.”). 
54 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (1994). 
55 See, e.g., Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional 
Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95; John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative 
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). 
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motive is difficult, however, both because legislators may successfully disguise 
it,56 and because the very concept of legislative motive may be a fiction in a multi-
member body.57 The courts also might try to determine whether the claimed 
motives are sufficiently persuasive to justify entrenchment. In the United States, 
this would require interpreting existing doctrine counseling against legislative 
entrenchment as applicable only where there are insufficiently persuasive 
apolitical reasons to allow entrenchment. One might doubt whether the courts can 
accomplish such substantive analysis apolitically.58 On the other hand, the courts 
might through common law be able to identify situations in which there are strong 
arguments for commitment bonds. The courts could then limit commitment bonds 
to these cases. 
A second approach in limiting commitment bonds is to permit 
entrenchment that is not too powerful. We noted above that as the face value of 
commitment bonds approaches infinity, these bonds become increasingly 
indistinguishable from straight legislative commitments.59 Bondholders will pay 
almost nothing for a commitment bond with a face value of $100 trillion because 
there is virtually no chance that the government would take any action that would 
lead to so great a transfer of value. This is true even if the courts would enforce 
such commitment bonds.  
The courts could allow commitment bonds where there remains some 
reasonable probability that the government will not meet its commitment. For 
example, the courts might tolerate a statute that would condition the sale of 
commitment bonds on receipt of at least 20% of their face value. It is difficult to 
see how the courts could arrive at a nonarbitrary percentage, but this is a line-
drawing problem that courts have overcome in other areas of constitutional law.60 
An approach along these lines should be especially attractive to those who worry 
that allowing legislative entrenchment might produce flawed legislation that can 
only be eliminated through constitutional amendment, as Posner and Vermeule 
                                               
56 See id.  
57 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) (arguing 
that Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem suggests that the concept of a single discernible legislative 
intent may be a fiction).  
58 An analogous doctrine is hard look review, and evidence suggests that judges’ political 
affiliations affect decisionmaking in this context. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, 
The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 767 (2008) (summarizing 
empirical evidence in the EPA and the NLRB context). 
59 See discussion supra Subsection II.A.2., p. 24. 
60 See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (finding a previous holding governing 
questioning of suspects inapplicable when a 14-day break in custody occurred); State Farm v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (noting that in reviewing punitive damage awards, “single-
digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process”). 
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note.61 Paying the price of breaking a commitment may be considerably more 
viable than constitutional amendment. 
Our goal is not to determine which approach is normatively the most 
attractive. We believe, however, that our identification below of potentially useful 
(though certainly controversial) applications of commitment bonds strengthens 
the case for allowing at least some commitment bonds, even assuming that courts 
would reject the Posner-Vermeule approach of permitting outright legislative 
entrenchment. 
Whether this is a satisfactory approach depends in part on how frequently 
the legislature might be expected to entrench simply to cement the achievements 
of transitory majorities. We suspect that purely political entrenchments via 
commitment bonds would be rare. Posner and Vermeule argue that just as 
legislatures enact sunset clauses because they value flexibility over stability, so 
too ought legislatures be able to entrench legislation because they value stability 
over flexibility.62 Whatever the merits of this argument, the existence of sunset 
clauses demonstrates that legislatures will not always seek as much legislative 
entrenchment as possible. In fact, the median voter in a legislature may be willing 
to enact legislation only if it sunsets. Often the median legislator will be willing to 
enact legislation without a sunset clause, only if future legislatures retain 
unfettered power to change the policy baseline. Thus even the majority party in a 
legislature is constrained in achieving many substantive policy initiatives favored 
by its leaders. In this way, political pressures should restrain Congress in using 
commitment bonds. 
3. Effects of Uncertainty about Constitutionality 
Let us suppose that a particular commitment bond is unconstitutional, 
either because all commitment bonds are unconstitutional or because there is a 
problem with a particular one. In practice, what would be the implications of 
unconstitutionality? Assuming that the commitment bond is structured so that the 
government would receive money initially from bondholders and pay only if it 
failed to achieve its objective, one can imagine attempts to block the legislation at 
two different points in time. As one example, the constitutionality might be 
challenged by a lawsuit seeking an injunction before the government accepts 
money from the bondholders. Another challenge could be from the government 
itself when the government must pay the bondholders for failure to live up to its 
commitment. A full analysis is beyond our scope, but we can anticipate potential 
problems for both challenges. Who would have standing to challenge the contract 
initially? And can the government escape its obligations under a contract on the 
                                               
61 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 1691-92. 
62 Id. at 1672. 
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ground that it might have encouraged unconstitutional actions when in fact the 
government failed to meet the intended goal? 
We suspect that the obstacles to an ex post challenge are smaller than the 
obstacles to an ex ante challenge. And yet for advocates of commitment bonds as 
well as opponents, there is a strong argument for resolving the constitutionality of 
commitment bonds ab initio. Supporters must worry that if there is some danger 
that bondholders will not be repaid, the government cannot expect to receive as 
much up front from issuing commitment bonds.63 The government might try to 
compensate for this by making a larger commitment than it otherwise would, but 
it may be difficult to calculate how large a commitment to make to compensate 
for legal uncertainty. Furthermore, the variance in outcomes would lower the 
amount that potential bondholders will pay. Opponents, meanwhile, might prefer 
to have the bonds invalidated before they have any constraining effect. Thus, if 
possible, a legislature might want to facilitate a relatively early challenge to 
commitment bonds, for example by granting statutory standing to any commercial 
entity that would be indirectly adversely affected.64 
B. Additional Challenges 
The danger that the courts might refuse to enforce commitment bonds is 
not the only obstacle to bondholders being paid. As discussed below, two other 
challenges to the enforcement of governmental commitment bonds are the 
possibilities of legislative reneging and negative bondholder influence.  
                                               
63 An alternative strategy for the government might be to place assets that would be used to pay 
holders of commitment bond in escrow in another country, and provide that the bonds should be 
adjudicated in that country’s legal system, with no deference to any rulings by the government’s 
own courts. We doubt that the United States would adopt this strategy, but it might be sensible for 
a country whose judicial system is not independent enough to ensure that any adjudication of 
commitment bonds would be sufficiently fair. There should be no obstacle, so far as we can 
identify, to U.S. courts adjudicating some other country’s commitment bonds. There have been 
examples analogous to this in U.S. legal history. See, for example, the International Claims 
Settlement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1621 et seq., which creates the Foreign Claims Settlement 
Commission (allowing U.S. nationals to bring claims against foreign nations); and the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), which extends jurisdiction to foreign citizens bringing suit 
for conduct occurring outside the United States. 
64 The difficulty will be constitutional standing doctrine. To bring a challenge, a plaintiff would 
need to show inter alia an “injury in fact.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
(1992). This might be satisfied by a showing that the government caused an immediate economic 
injury by passing a statute authorizing the sale of commitment bonds. 
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1. The Credibility of Governmental Commitment 
There are a number of possible actions a legislature could take to retrench 
on its commitment.65 For example, a legislature might pass a statute explicitly 
extinguishing the rights of bondholders. Or a legislature might pass a statute that 
violates a prior commitment but provides that it should not be interpreted as doing 
so. If the legislature casually abandons commitments that it makes through 
commitment bonds, then government use of such bonds will not be credible. 
Bondholders will bid much less for the bonds than they otherwise would. The 
legislature could respond by selling bonds purportedly worth even more to make 
up for the shortfall, but this would likely make bondholders even more skeptical 
that the legislature would ever pay up. After all, if the legislature seems unlikely 
to pay up on a relatively small commitment to which it fails to adhere, it will 
almost certainly not pay many more dollars for the same commitment. 
Even if the legislature theoretically retained the power to renege on 
commitment bonds, it might not do so. After all, reneging would establish a 
precedent making it more likely that the government would renege in the future. 
Auctions for new commitment bonds would then yield much less in revenue. 
Similar logic helps explain why many borrowers pay off loans from creditors 
even if it is unlikely that the creditors will sue them for the loans: they hope to be 
able to borrow more in the future. Legislators may hope both to be able to 
constrain themselves in the future and to raise money from such commitments. Of 
course, legislators, like individuals, also may feel some ethical compulsion to 
meet their promises to others even if they prove unable to meet their 
commitments to themselves. It is thus possible that a legislature might make 
credible commitments to pay bondholders should they fail to meet their own 
commitments, even if the legislature legally may renege on its commitments. 
However, this conclusion is far from certain. And a legislature that wishes 
to sell commitment bonds could benefit if it could not renege on its commitments. 
The most straightforward way to accomplish this is through a constitutional 
provision that obliges the government to meet its commitments. In the United 
States, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment66 as helping to serve this function. In Lynch v. United States,67 
Congress purported to cancel some rights under war risk insurance policies that it 
had issued. The Court conceded that under the doctrine of sovereign immunity,68 
                                               
65 The Winstar case discussed above is not directly relevant here, because in that case, the 
government claimed that it was not liable under the contract for its sovereign act, but did not 
purport to extinguish its contractual obligations. See supra note 42. 
66 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
67 292 U.S. 571 (1934). 
68 Id. at 580-81. 
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Congress could at any time withdraw its consent for the United States to be 
sued.69 But it interpreted the cancellation of the insurance contracts as terminating 
substantive contractual rights, not as withdrawing the right of contracting parties 
to sue the United States for doing so.70 Admittedly this leaves open the possibility 
that a later Congress could achieve a different result by simply purporting to 
withdraw the right to sue without affecting the substantive contractual right. 
Congress might be hesitant to take that step, however, as doing so could 
undermine not only its ability to issue commitment bonds in the future but also to 
make commitments to ordinary contracting partners.71  
It is possible that courts eager to enhance the ability of the government to 
enter into firm commitments would find some constitutional support for the 
proposition that the government cannot escape its contractual commitments 
(except where it has reserved the power to do so in the contract itself). For 
example, courts might read the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as 
incorporating principles similar to those of the Contracts Clause,72 which is 
generally understood to apply only to the states,73 even though courts have 
previously rejected this conclusion. Alternatively, courts might find support in the 
Public Debt Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.74 This Clause appears to 
protect conventional bonds issued by the United States,75 and it may also protect 
other types of government debts.76 The question is whether the federal 
government, by issuing commitment bonds on the credit of the United States, 
                                               
69 See, e.g., id. at 581 (“Although consent to sue was thus given when the policy issued, Congress 
retained power to withdraw the consent at any time. For consent to sue the United States is a 
privilege accorded, not the grant of a property right protected by the Fifth Amendment.”). 
70 Id. at 583 (“It seems clear that it intended to take away the right; and that Congress did not 
intend to preserve the right and merely withdraw consent to sue the United States.”). 
71 See Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1561 
(1992). 
72 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  
73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any . . . Law impairing the Obligation 
of Contracts . . . .”). 
74 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 4 (“The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized 
by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing 
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.”).  
75 Though specifically targeted at Civil War debt, the Clause is written in general terms. See 
Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth-Amendment Style, 33 TULSA L.J. 
561, 582 (1997); see also Phanor J. Eder, A Forgotten Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 
CORNELL L.Q. 1, 15 (1933) (concluding that “the intention was to lay down a constitutional canon 
for all time in order to protect and maintain the national honor and to strengthen the national 
credit”). 
76 See Abramowicz, supra note 75, at 587-89 (arguing, through a focus on the “including” portion 
of the Clause, that it protects some obligations besides bonds). 
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would fall within this provision, and there is no historical evidence or case law 
that produces a clear answer. There is, in short, enough support for American 
courts to protect constitutionally a commitment that would make governmental 
issuance of commitment bonds credible, but the courts might well choose not to 
demand enforcement even if they do find commitment bonds constitutional. 
2. Bondholder Political Influence 
Another danger with commitment bonds is a political form of moral 
hazard.77 Bondholders have an economic incentive to try to influence the political 
process to ensure that the government does not meet its commitments. For 
example, if the government commits to greater education expenditures, the 
commitment bondholders might attempt to organize as a political force against 
increased educational spending. The greater the value of a bond, the more 
incentive bondholders will have to try to ensure that the government does not 
meet its commitment. For example, they might give political contributions to 
candidates who oppose the goal to which the government wishes to commit, or 
sponsor mass advertising campaigns against the government’s goal. 
There are three general approaches that the government might take to 
reduce the danger that bondholders will use their political influence to thwart the 
government’s commitment. The first is to restrict bond sales to entities that seem 
unlikely to be able to influence the government. If, for example, foreigners are 
precluded from making political contributions,78 then the government might sell 
the bonds only to foreigners, and further provide that the bonds will be 
unenforceable if they are later resold to American citizens.  
A second approach, and likely a more practical one, would be to ensure 
diffuse ownership of the commitment bonds. For example, the bonds could 
stipulate that if at any time, an individual, entity or group or affiliated79 
individuals or entities comes to own at least two percent of the outstanding bonds, 
the bonds owned in excess of that percentage will not be redeemable. 
                                               
77 See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 14 (1986) (defining moral hazard as the “tendency of an insured to underallocate 
to loss prevention after purchasing insurance”). 
78 See 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2004) (banning contributions by foreigners); Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010) (reserving the question of whether the ban can be 
justified by “a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from 
influencing our Nation’s political process”). 
79 To count, an affiliation would need to relate to the bonds. If, for example, twenty percent of 
bondholders happened to be members of the Roman Catholic Church, that presumably would not 
be inconsistent with the diffusion requirement. An exception might be if the Church encouraged 
its members to purchase commitment bonds and later donate them to the government. An 
association of bondholders, more importantly, could trigger the penalty provisions. 
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Enforcement of such a requirement might require the ability of the government to 
investigate possible relationships among bondholders, but it seems plausible that a 
government could prevent concentrated ownership with such penalty provisions. 
The goal of diffusing ownership and preventing coordination among bondholders 
is to ensure that there will be a free rider problem among the bondholders. Each 
bondholder might like all bondholders donate to political organizations fighting 
against the government’s commitment, but because each has only a small stake in 
the issue, no bondholder is willing to invest personal resources to advancing this 
common goal. 
A third approach is to prohibit lobbying and related activities by 
bondholders. It may be impractical to criminalize free speech, but the bonds could 
provide that anyone who attempts to influence the government not to meet its 
commitment shall be ineligible to cash any bonds or to transfer them to others. 
The legislation might be drafted to be neutral, so that any lobbying in favor of the 
government meeting its commitment would also prevent payment to the lobbying 
party. The government could establish safe harbors, such as uncoordinated 
political contributions to individual candidates up to a total of some value, and it 
will presumably not be practical for the government to identify all de minimis 
spending anyway. However, this approach should be sufficient to limit the ability 
of third parties to engage in coordinated campaigns that seek to influence 
government. The only type of coordination that the bonds should tolerate (indeed, 
encourage) is coordination of efforts to enforce the bonds. 
Some combination of these efforts seems likely to offset enough of any 
increased incentive to thwart the government’s commitment so that the net effect 
of a commitment bond will still be to make it more likely that the government will 
meet its commitment than had it not sold commitment bonds. As long as the net 
effect is in the direction of greater rather than less commitment, the government 
could always increase the face value of the commitment bonds in order to ensure 
that it achieves any desired total level of commitment. Of course, if the net effect 
were to make it less likely that the government would meet its commitment, the 
government could sell bonds that would pay off if the government made its 
commitment. This would give private parties incentives to lobby for meeting the 
commitment, and it could be more effective by insisting on relatively 
concentrated ownership.  
To assess the likely success of a commitment or anti-commitment bond, 
the government (or any other individual or entity considering issuing commitment 
bonds) could create a market test.80 Before definitively deciding on the 
                                               
80 The mechanism described here is not the only market mechanism that could be used to make 
this assessment. An alternative approach would be to use conditional prediction markets. See 
MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
DECISION MAKING 141-44, 199-204 (2008). An advantage of this approach is that it is difficult to 
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commitment bonds device, the government could solicit orders for commitment 
bonds contingent upon different total levels of commitment bond sales. For 
example, it might conduct auctions for commitment bonds contingent on the 
government’s agreeing to issue a total of $100,000, $100,000,000, or 
$100,000,000,000.81 Or, it could ask bidders to submit their bids as a function of 
the commitment bond level, so that it can assess demand for intermediate values. 
The government would promise to refund the money paid at the auctions (with 
interest) if it did not decide to go through with the sale of commitment bonds at 
that level. Just as with goal-setting auctions,82 the prices at auction would allow 
the government to obtain at least crude estimates of the market’s estimate of the 
probability that the government would meet its commitment for different possible 
levels of commitment bond sales. These estimates should be sufficiently accurate 
to validate or discount the concern that the bonds might have offsetting or 
negative consequences. The government also might use similar auctions to assess 
the effects of different bond restrictions on the government’s likely success. 
C. Functions of Governmental Commitment 
If commitment bonds are a constitutionally permissible and effective 
means of improving the government’s ability to commit to a course of action, then 
there are several potential functions that commitment bonds legitimately might 
serve (besides increasing the future resolve of the committing party). 
Commitment bonds can credibly signal to third parties the government’s 
commitment in a way that will induce beneficial conduct by third parties. 
Commitment bonds can also facilitate political compromise where agreement is 
impeded either by the need to resolve details or by the concern that a particular 
approach might facilitate later legislative change. 
1. Vindication of Higher-Order Principles 
Just as we may believe that it makes sense to permit an individual to 
commit his or her forward-looking self that wants to lose weight over a later self 
that in the absence of a commitment would prefer to eat a piece of chocolate cake, 
so too might we permit a forward-looking government to commit to some goal 
that in the absence of the commitment it would gladly sacrifice when confronted 
with some tempting legislation. One can support constitutions and oppose 
                                                                                                                                
manipulate prediction markets. See id. at 28-32. 
81 The government need not take orders for the entire face value of the commitment bonds. For 
example, to estimate demand for the $100 billion in bonds, it might solicit firm orders to buy only 
$100 million in bonds. These firm orders would then become the first sales of the bonds should 
the government then agree to sell $100 billion in bonds. 
82 See supra Part I.B.2. 
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governmental commitment bonds, or vice-versa, because the requirements for 
creating or amending constitutions differ from the requirements for creating 
commitment bonds. But commitment bonds may be a useful mechanism for 
accomplishing subconstitutional commitments for limited periods of time, 
especially when constitutions are difficult to amend or when some imperfect 
degree of adherence to constitutional principles is deemed desirable.  
As we discuss below, keeping a balanced budget and committing to (or 
against) economic bailouts are two examples of this. Eugene Kontorovich has 
noted that some constitutional provisions can be interpreted as liability rules 
rather than as property rules to give the government the ability to override the 
higher-order principles in the event of exigencies.83 Commitment bonds can 
potentially extend this approach to contexts in which there would be no 
identifiable party harmed by the government’s deviation from its commitment. 
They also are more flexible than liability rule constitutional provisions, as 
changing the amount of the commitment bond can allow the government to adjust 
the degree of its commitment. This way, the government can make either small or 
large commitments in a particular direction. 
a. Budget Balance 
Perhaps the most obvious application of commitment bonds, given past 
interest in the issue, would be to encourage the government to commit to balanced 
budgets. While voters may be able to understand the importance of limiting 
deficits, they may end up supporting politicians who promise more spending and 
lower taxes, blaming deficits on the spending and taxation choices of political 
opponents.84 This may be because voters have limited information or because they 
have limited self-control. Let us assume for the sake of argument that we should 
prioritize voters’ beliefs in budget balance over their affection for deficit-financed 
spending. How best to achieve this? 
A constitutional amendment is one possibility,85 and many jurisdictions 
have constitutional provisions insisting on some form of budget balance. But it is 
also possible to imagine subconstitutional approaches to balanced budget 
commitment. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law86 sought to commit the 
government to balanced budgets by providing for automatic spending reductions 
                                               
83 Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 755 (2004). 
84 41% Fine with Budget Deficit if Taxes Are Cut, RASMUSSEN REPORTS, February 3, 2010. 
85 See generally Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment that Does 
What It Is Supposed To Do (and No More), 106 YALE L.J. 1449 (1997). 
86 2 U.S.C. § 900 (1985). 
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in the event that a budget was not in balance.87 Posner and Vermeule point out 
that this is not a true legislative entrenchment,88 because Congress could in any 
future legislation simply declare an exception to the balanced budget principle. 
Other legislative approaches seeking to advance balanced budget goals, such as 
pay-as-you-go requirements, are subject to the same problem. Thus, even if it 
would be possible to overcome the difficulties with the statute that led the 
Supreme Court to strike it down,89 an alternative approach to improving the 
government’s ability to commit to balanced budgets might be desirable.  
A simple commitment bonds approach would provide that if the 
government runs a deficit in a particular year, it would be required to pay a fixed 
amount to the holders of the commitment bonds. The commitment bonds could 
include any exceptions, such as military or economic emergencies, that balanced 
budget amendments also feature. But this provides no incentives to limit deficit 
spending once the budget is already in deficit, and a great deal would depend on 
whether the government is on one side or the other of the balanced budget line. A 
preferable approach thus would be to make payments depend on the degree to 
which the government runs a deficit. For example, the government might pay 
$0.50 per dollar of deficit up to $100 billion, $1 per dollar for the next $150 
billion, and so on. This would make it more expensive for the government to 
engage in deficit spending, but it would not necessarily eliminate it altogether. 
A significant potential challenge to the use of commitment bonds to 
reduce the deficit is the possibility of accounting disputes potentially leading to 
litigation. To the extent that bondholders anticipate litigation, they will pay less 
for commitment bonds, so the seller of commitment bonds bears the full cost of 
litigation (or, more precisely, its own actual cost, plus its opponents’ anticipated 
costs). The challenge is to find mechanisms that make dispute resolution 
relatively inexpensive, yet effective. Of course, balanced budget amendments face 
similar challenges, and one possible approach is to borrow from the idea of 
maintaining an “independent scorekeeper.”90 For example, an administrative 
agency might be established to determine whether the government has run deficits 
and to pay off bondholders. Judicial review of such decisions might be limited; 
agency determinations ordinarily would be subject to the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s “substantial evidence” test.91 Assuming that the courts would be 
                                               
87 See generally Thomas J. Downey, The Futility of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 25  
88 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 1695-97. 
89 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
90 See Seto, supra note 85, at 1514. 
91 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2006) (setting forth the “substantial evidence” test that applies to formal 
proceedings); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir 1984) (applying same standard to informal proceedings). 
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relatively independent, this should make it difficult for the agency to stiff 
bondholders. Meanwhile, as long as protections are taken to prevent bondholders 
from influencing political processes, they also seem unlikely to be able to capture 
the agency.92 
b. Bailouts 
A balanced budget constraint is a commitment at the center of the 
workings of government, but government also could use commitment bonds to 
achieve narrower (yet still potentially important) purposes. Suppose, for example, 
that Congress worried that the recent economic bailouts had created an 
unacceptable level of moral hazard.93 Congress might then determine that it would 
be beneficial to commit to not grant bailouts in the future. It might even do so as 
to specific entities. For example, the government might decide that to prevent 
excessive risk-taking by Fannie Mae, and to repudiate the widely accepted view 
that the government implicitly backs its obligations, the government might enter 
into a commitment bond that would pay off if it assumed any future Fannie Mae 
obligations. The government might commit to paying a fixed sum in the event it 
assumed any obligations, plus a variable amount depending on the degree of 
obligations assumed.  
Of course, our purpose is not to advocate for or against this approach. 
Perhaps such a commitment would be ineffective in preventing excessive risk-
taking, and the government would then be unable to avoid economic disaster. 
Perhaps there are better solutions, such as ensuring that no entity is too big to 
fail94 and that the failure of one entity will not produce contagion.95 But the 
example highlights that it sometimes might be useful for the government to enter 
into commitment bonds for the future at the same time as it does the opposite in 
the present. Indeed, whenever there is concern that a governmental action would 
create a bad precedent (in an informal, nonjudicial sense), the government might 
                                               
92 Cf. John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 
742 (1986) (noting that agencies aware of the possibility of capture have sometimes been able to 
undertake reforms to prevent it). 
93 See, for example, Peter L. Bernstein, What’s Free about Free Enterprise?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
27, 2008, at BU1; and Sudeep Reddy & Michael R. Crittenden, Fed's Kohn Concedes Risk in AIG 
Rescue, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2009, for discussions of the moral hazard created by economic 
bailouts.  
94 See, e.g., GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK 
BAILOUTS (2004) (discussing the problem of credibility and the degree to which governments will 
not let big banks fail). 
95 See generally Christopher Thorson, Proposals to Reduce Systemic Risk Compared, 28 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 458, 459-60 (2009) (noting that the possibility of contagion can increase 
systemic risk). 
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enter into a commitment bond to refrain from doing the same thing in the future. 
Of course, if the commitment is justifiable then, it might well have been 
justifiable earlier, but it may be better for the government to issue commitment 
bonds than either to create a bad policy precedent or to avoid that precedent by 
taking an action with large negative consequences in the present or near future. 
This highlights an important point about commitment that is sometimes 
overlooked. Often policy analysis proceeds on the assumption that the 
government ought to do what it would have committed to at an earlier time had it 
addressed an issue. For example, patent theorists seek to determine optimal ex 
ante patent policy and may assume that legal ambiguities should be resolved 
based on such theoretical considerations, but they do not consider that deviating 
from these optimal rules in an anti-patent direction may be optimal because the 
policy developed today will not affect invention in the past. Or, bankruptcy 
theorists assess the incentives of bankruptcy on the capital markets without 
acknowledging that many of the distributional effects of changes in the 
bankruptcy laws will stem from contracts that people have already entered into. 
Even when governmental commitment to some approach makes sense 
prospectively, a different approach may make sense retrospectively when the 
regulations have different incentive effects. The government might 
simultaneously seek to tie its hands for the future and to untie the binds of the 
past. Only when the latter task undermines the former task should the government 
necessarily do now what it wants to commit to doing in the future. 
Returning to the bailout context, consider an argument that is the reverse 
of the one above, namely, that the government should commit to bailing out 
institutions like Freddie Mac because this helps them maintain a low cost of 
capital. (As this reversal emphasizes, our theory is agnostic about the appropriate 
direction of bailout commitments.) This argument is distinct from the argument 
that the government ought now bail out such institutions because they had an 
implicit government guarantee. Suppose, for example, that the current costs of the 
bailout of these institutions would exceed the present benefits. If an implicit 
guarantee were the only type of government guarantee that were possible, then the 
government would face a trade-off. Violating its implicit bailout guarantee would 
weaken the credibility of prospective bailout guarantees. With this hypothetical, 
the government’s optimal strategy is to break its previous guarantee while seeking 
to strengthen its future guarantees.  
Introduction of commitment bonds or some other explicit guarantee 
mechanism can accomplish this. Even if the public no longer trusts the 
government’s implicit commitments, the commitment bond mechanism will alter 
the government’s incentives should a similar situation arise. If the government 
does issue commitment bonds—either committing to bailing out or not bailing out 
an institution—then it will not be as easy to evade the commitment should a 
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situation later arise in which there is a tension between present expediency and 
future commitment benefits. The benefit of commitment bonds is that the 
government can increase the credibility of a claim that it will take a certain action 
in the future regardless of the action that it takes in the present. But the cost is that 
the government does this by genuinely constraining its options in the later period. 
2. Signaling 
The above examples of governmental commitment bonds are analogous to 
an individual’s attempt to use commitment bonds to improve self-control, but 
there may be signaling aspects as well. For example, an anti-bailout commitment 
might be useful not only because the government worries that it will not have the 
self control to ignore a failed enterprise, but also because it hopes to send a signal 
that will discourage excessive risk-taking. The other commitments discussed 
presumably also have some signaling function. The anti-deficits commitment may 
reassure purchasers of federal debt that the government will be able to meet its 
obligations. There are, however, situations in which the role of signaling may be 
even larger. 
Another example would be an anti-inflation commitment in monetary 
policy. The literature on commitment mechanisms for monetary policy is well-
developed, as economists have shown that signals of future policy themselves 
affect social welfare. More specifically, inflation depends in part on expectations 
of inflation.96 It matters not just how expansive monetary policy will be but also 
how expansive the public believes monetary policy will be. So central bankers 
can achieve better results if they persuade the public that they will take actions 
that will tend to result in low inflation, whatever in fact they actually do 
afterward. This leads to counterintuitive conclusions, such as that the President’s 
optimal strategy is to choose a central banker who is relatively more concerned 
about low inflation than the President is.97 Of course, this will be most effective if 
the central bank is relatively independent, and so central bank independence is 
also justified in part based on its anticipated effect on inflation expectations.98 
                                               
96 See, e.g., Edmund S. Phelps, Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation and Optimal 
Unemployment over Time, 34 ECONOMICA 254 (1967); Lars E.O. Svensson, Open-Economy 
Inflation Targeting, 50 J. INT’L ECON. 155 (2000). 
97 See Kenneth Rogoff, The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target, 
100 Q.J. ECON. 1169, 1177-89 (1985); see also Alan S. Blinder, Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do 
We Care? How Do We Build It?, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1421 (2000). 
98 See Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers, Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic 
Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 151 (1993); 
Blinder, supra note 97; Stanley Fischer, Modern Central Banking, in THE FUTURE OF CENTRAL 
BANKING: THE TERCENTENARY SYMPOSIUM OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND 262 (Forrest Capie et al. 
eds., 1994); Rogoff, supra note 97. 
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Central bank independence and selection of a conservative central banker are thus 
examples of non-compensating commitment mechanisms. 
A compensating approach would be for the bonds to specify an inflation 
target and promise payment for every basis point by which inflation is exceeded. 
(Ideally, the inflation rate itself should be measured by an agency independent 
from both the central bank and executive control.) Especially to the extent that 
bondholders are outside of the country, this changes the central banker’s calculus, 
leading the central banker to err on the side of low inflation more than he or she 
otherwise would. It is possible that commitment bonds could be set too high, 
leading to inefficiently low inflation or even deflation, especially when the effects 
of policy on inflation are uncertain. But in theory, there is some optimal level of 
commitment bonds, taking into account factors including the degree to which 
inflation depends on inflation expectations.  
That does not necessarily mean that commitment bonds are the best 
approach for committing to an anti-inflation policy. There will be some cost to 
commitment bonds, as the payments received ex ante from bondholders will be 
somewhat less than the expected ex post payments to bondholders, as a result of 
the risk that the bondholders are assuming. Choosing a relatively conservative 
central banker is simpler. But a virtue of anti-inflation commitment bonds is that 
they do not require the appointment of unaccountable officials who are chosen 
precisely because they will tend to make decisions that the executive will not like. 
Additionally, a danger of central bank independence is that it may become 
difficult to replace officials for reasons other than their degree of commitment to 
low inflation. Meanwhile, anti-inflation commitment bonds may be superior to 
mechanical commitments to low inflation policy, such as the constant growth rate 
rule championed by Milton Friedman.99 This is because anti-inflation commitment 
bonds allow the central banker flexibility to consider all economic circumstances 
in formulating monetary policy.  
Monetary policy is frequently cited in the economic literature as an 
example of policy that is optimally time inconsistent. Policy is time consistent if 
one would make the same decisions whether committing to a policy path at the 
outset (assuming full information availability) or making policy decisions at each 
point in time. Inflation policy is time inconsistent because one’s incentive is to 
commit to a stricter anti-inflation policy for any particular factual circumstance 
than one would like to choose if that circumstance actually arises. Another classic 
example of time-inconsistent policy is government flood relief.100 The time-
inconsistent policy is to be more cold-hearted than one would be after a flood has 
                                               
99 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY STABILITY (1960).  
100 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Incentives and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
167 (1991). 
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occurred, because one would like homebuilders to internalize costs of their 
location decisions. Commitment bonds requiring the government to pay third 
parties some multiple of whatever they pay flood victims could credibly move the 
government closer to the time-inconsistent policy by signaling to the public that 
the government will not be as willing to provide relief. 
The flood example illustrates how a government can use commitment 
bonds to make conditional commitments. With a conditional commitment bond, 
the bondholders will be paid only if some contingency occurs (flood) and the 
government fails to meet its commitment to act in a certain way (not 
compensating). As another example, a country could commit to reducing certain 
tariffs if another country takes some specified actions to open trade.101 The 
revenues from such bonds would be discounted to reflect both the probability that 
either condition will not be met (in the trade example, the possibilities that one 
country would not take the specified action or that the committing country would 
not follow through on its commitment would both decrease auction revenue). 
Alternatively, the government might agree to reimburse bondholders if the first 
condition is not met. An advantage of doing so is that it would be easier to tell 
from the bond prices what bondholders think the probability of the government 
meeting its commitment is should the contingency arise. 
3. Facilitating Political Compromise 
Commitment bonds can be used not only to send signals to third parties, 
but also to improve the operation of the legislature itself by facilitating political 
compromise. There are at least two means by which commitment bonds can 
achieve this. First, legislatures unable to agree on all the details of legislation may 
enact provisional legislative agreements in which they commit to resolving 
additional issues at a later time. This reduces the chance that strategic bargaining 
may scuttle attempts at a full resolution. The commitment would be to pass 
legislation having specific features or meeting identified objectives. By increasing 
the cost of failing to enact legislation, such a commitment reduces the chance that 
political adversaries will use some minor issue as reason to withhold support for a 
compromise. Second, commitment bonds may be used to alleviate the concerns of 
a group worried that prospective legislation might lead to later legislation that 
                                               
101 A legislature could grant the executive branch the power to issue trade-related commitment 
bonds. This would give the executive substantial power to influence trade policy and reduce the 
chance of special interests scuttling trade agreements. Commitment bonds may thus be a substitute 
for procedural mechanisms that seek to prevent special interests from influencing legislation. For 
example, Congress sometimes grants the President “fast-track” authority to negotiate agreements, 
which means that it will vote the agreements up or down without amendment. See Trade Act of 
1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2191-94, as amended in 19 U.S.C. § 3803-05. Congress could achieve a similar 
effect, reducing its freedom of action, by granting the President commitment bonds authority. 
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they would oppose. A commitment bond could be used to make it relatively costly 
for a later legislature to enact that later legislation. This would compensate for any 
increase in the probability of that later legislation’s occurrence resulting from the 
initial legislative steps.  
a. Provisional Legislative Agreements 
In a provisional legislative agreement commitment bond, the legislature 
commits to enacting legislation that includes some specified features. It may be 
useful when a majority of the legislature agrees on certain aspects of a legislative 
compromise but cannot agree on the details. By committing to agree later on more 
detailed legislation, the legislature reduces the competing factions’ incentives to 
engage in strategic bargaining, thus enhancing the chance that at least some form 
of agreement is reached. The statute enacting a provisional legislative agreement 
itself need not have any binding effect beyond the commitment to pay those who 
purchase the bonds. This helps explain why it may be more beneficial than a 
statute that simply sets forth what the competing factions have agreed upon. A 
statute that simply sets forth vague commitments may be unworkable, meaning 
that the country will pay a heavy price in litigation and uncertainty if the 
legislature is unable to reach an agreement. The commitment bonds also ensure 
that there will be a heavy price for failure to agree, with the bondholders’ 
payment compensating for this. 
Suppose, for example, that a legislature is negotiating immigration reform. 
A majority may have agreed that the country will increase the number of 
immigrants that it allows in the country to some threshold by some date, and that 
the country will increase its enforcement of rules against illegal immigration so 
that the number of illegal immigrants will be no greater than a specified number 
by that date. But there might be critical disagreements, such as whether there will 
be an amnesty for current illegal immigrants, as well as countless disagreements 
on less divisive issues, such as how many immigrants each country will be 
allotted. The government could commit to increasing the number of immigrants 
and reducing the number of illegal immigrants by the specified numbers. The 
commitment bonds allow the legislature to increase the chance of achieving a 
more complete resolution of an issue.  
Even if provisional legislative agreement commitment bonds were to 
become an accepted and frequently used legislative tool, it will not always be easy 
to reach provisional legislative agreements. Sometimes, it might be obvious that 
the provisional agreement will tend to favor one faction over another. For 
example, there might be widespread agreement on certain aspects of some future 
health care reform but a gulf on a key issue (say, whether a health reform plan 
should include a “public option”). If a slight majority of legislators favor a public 
option, then opponents of a public option might worry that commitment bonds 
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ultimately will force them to give up on the issue, and so it will not be possible to 
persuade them to support the issuance of such bonds. Commitment bonds will be 
more feasible when there is some plausible middle ground on an issue or 
compromises that might be made to facilitate agreement. Risk-averse politicians 
might eschew commitment bonds especially if there would be a potential 
“winner” and “loser” resulting from their issuance. 
b. Sanding of Slippery Slopes 
One reason for difficulty in passing legislation is that one faction may 
worry that the legislation, though itself beneficial, might have adverse 
consequences later on. For example, consider the issue of the government 
possibly creating a gun registry so that it can better track handgun ownership and 
solve crimes.102 Some gun rights activists may not in principle be opposed to the 
government having this information and may even favor the government using 
such information to punish the illegal use of guns. But they might worry that this 
will make it easier for a later legislature to take the further step of confiscating 
guns via a gun ban.  
A commitment bond requiring the government to pay a large sum to third 
parties should it ever ban guns altogether might help to provide enough support 
for the registry step. In effect, the commitment bond adds sand to the slippery 
slope, making it more difficult for later legislatures to slip down. And the steeper 
the legislation makes a slope, the more sand will be needed to prevent slippage. 
Importantly, the commitment bond can provide this sand regardless of the 
underlying reason that the slope is slippery. Eugene Volokh has identified at least 
six different reasons that a gun registry might facilitate a gun ban.103 Even if the 
reason for the slippery slope is not that gun registration makes confiscation 
cheaper, the expense of commitment bonds will make a later legislature hesitate 
to enact them. Volokh offers some mechanisms for countering slippery slopes in 
general, including making the policy at the bottom of the slippery slope 
unconstitutional or at least ensuring that the Constitution does not mandate sliding 
down the slippery slope,104 but commitment bonds provide a more general 
solution. 
                                               
102 This example is borrowed from Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1028 (2003) 
103 Id. at 1033-34. The reasons are that “[r]egistration may change people’s attitudes,” id. at 1033, 
that registration may be a small change that the public ignores, that registration “may create 
political momentum in favor of gun control supporters,” id., that registration may reduce political 
support for guns by making it more complex to purchase them, that “[r]egistration may lower the 
cost of confiscation,” and that registration “may trigger the operation of another rule” such as the 
Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement to make confiscation easier, id. at 1034. 
104 Id. at 1037. 
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A challenge to the use of commitment bonds in the gun registration 
context is that the bonds might need to be permanent if they are to be sufficiently 
attractive to gun rights supporters, who may be concerned about the long-term 
survival of freedom and thus have a long time horizon.105 This is not necessarily 
true, as even commitment bonds that will last only a couple of decades might lead 
gun rights supporters, or at least median legislators, to conclude that the bonds 
sufficiently decrease the chance of a gun ban. And by doing so, the bonds might 
make the overall legislative package attractive. There is no technical barrier to 
permanent commitment bonds or commitments for the distant future; the bonds 
can specify that they will pay off whenever some contingency comes to pass. Of 
course, commitments for the distant future will receive less at auction because of 
discounting, though legislators presumably also discount the cost of 
commitments. Indeed, a concern about permanence may be that self-interested 
legislators will discount distant future commitments more than bondholders, 
because the legislators will not likely be in office when the bill comes due. It may 
be too easy to sell out the future for a small present advantage. This is, of course, 
a problem in other contexts as well,106 but commitment bonds aggravate the 
concern. 
A danger is that permanent commitment bonds or commitment bonds for 
the long-term future may simply be unsustainable, especially if the legislature 
enters into such a commitment lightly. There is then a danger that the 
commitment bonds will simply be a mechanism for deferring a problem to the 
future. This would establish an unrealistic policy baseline that will impose high 
costs on a future legislature in much the same way that deficit spending may 
burden future generations. As a prudential matter, it may make sense for the 
government to sell commitment bonds only when the auction revenues suggest 
that there is a reasonably high chance that the government will be able to meet its 
commitment.107 The government could ensure this by auctioning separate 
commitment bonds for different periods and comparing auction revenues to the 
discounted potential payout. It would then cancel an auction (or perhaps all of the 
auctions) if the auction revenues were so high that it appeared that there was a 
sufficiently high chance that the government would not be able to meet its 
                                               
105 Gun rights supporters often argue that their cause is about conserving freedom. See, e.g., 
Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun Control, and 
the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L.J. 569, 577 (2006); 
Charlton Heston, The Second Amendment: America's First Freedom, in GUNS IN AMERICA: A 
READER 199, 203 (Jan E. Dizard et al. eds., 1999). 
106 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 118 (2005) (noting the 
problem in the context of global warming). 
107 Above, we noted that we also might limit commitment bonds to ensure that there is a nontrivial 
chance that the government will not meet its commitment. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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commitment. This approach provides some incentive for potential bondholders to 
imagine different possible states of the future world and consider carefully what 
legislators may not, whether or not it makes sense to make that long-term 
commitment. For example, bondholders would consider whether gun control 
would be more or less useful in the future.108 
III. MUTUAL COMMITMENT BONDS 
In all of the examples so far, a single entity has attempted to make a 
commitment by selling commitment bonds. In some of these examples, the 
purpose underlying the commitment related to a relationship between that party 
and another party, such as one party using a commitment bond to communicate a 
signal to another party. Our examples showed that, however, even in the signaling 
case, it is not essential that the commitment be entered into as a contractual 
concession to another party. Cooter and Porat disguise the heart of the anti-
insurance contract, which is the relationship between a committing party and a 
third party, by focusing instead on the relationship between a promisor and a 
promisee.109  For example, when a manufacturer sells a commitment bond to a 
third party with a promise to pay that third party when the manufacturer’s 
products break, it is largely irrelevant whether the manufacturer agrees to do this 
in its contract with the consumer or binds itself in advance of entering into 
agreements with consumers.  
It might then seem that considering mutual commitments—in which each 
of two or more parties individually agrees to enter into a commitment—would 
add no more to the analysis and would merely focus on the subset of cases that 
Cooter and Porat have already carefully and cleverly analyzed.110 True, when 
parties enter into such mutual commitments, the effects are essentially the sum of 
the effects of the individual commitments. What is new about mutual commitment 
bonds is that each party entering into the agreement agrees to constrain itself 
because it wants another party to constrain itself. One party’s commitment is the 
consideration for another’s.  
As a simple example, each of two married individuals might be happy 
with his or her own weight, but each wants the other to lose weight. Thus, the 
                                               
108 An argument that gun control will be less necessary in the distant future is that better 
surveillance technology may allow authorities to identify illegal use of firearms more easily, thus 
deterring such use without confiscating guns. See Volokh, supra note 102. But better surveillance 
technology might also mean that use of guns for self-defense is less necessary. Id. We can, of 
course, imagine many other analyses, and these arguments depend on the premise that society will 
choose to adopt widespread surveillance technology. 
109 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. 
110 Cooter & Porat, supra note 6. 
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couple might agree contractually that both will enter simultaneously into weight 
loss commitment contracts. This might be superior to a more standard bet or 
contractual arrangement between the parties, who might share a bank account and 
in any event might want each to encourage the other to lose weight rather than to 
gain it.111 There are alternatives to the use of commitment bonds in this example 
that could provide similar ex post incentives, but, without the compensatory 
payment provided by commitment bonds, the cost of constraint may be too high. 
For example, two parties entering into a mutual commitment could simply 
promise that each will give money to a third party if either of the committing 
parties fails to live up to its commitment. The possibility of receiving either some 
up-front compensation from the third party or compensation in the event of 
success would make this arrangement considerably more attractive. 
An appreciation of the possibility of mutual commitment bonds, however, 
points to some general classes of problems that the bonds can solve and for which 
simple contractual penalty provisions will be ineffective. One set of cases in 
which mutual commitment bonds may be useful are those in which multiple 
entities collectively wish to send a signal to third parties, but the possibility of 
renegotiation undermines the effectiveness of the signal. Other cases in which the 
bonds may be useful are those in which parties’ conduct is not easily measurable, 
and those in which the parties have not yet entered into a contract with one 
another. Section III.A develops these classes in more detail, and Section III.B 
explores potential legal applications of mutual commitment bonds among private 
parties as well as among governments to develop these points further. 
A. Reasons for Mutual Commitment 
1. Group Signaling 
The motivation for mutual commitment bonds most akin to that for single 
entity commitment bonds is the idea that a group of entities may wish collectively 
to signal or credibly convey information about their future behavior. For example, 
suppose that a group of electricity generators is concerned about the possibility 
that the government might devise costly command-and-control regulations to 
reduce pollution. The coalition wishes to show that it will reduce pollution to 
socially desired levels without government interference. It might then sell 
commitment bonds requiring each member of the group to pay some large fine to 
a third party if that member fails to meet its individual goal.112 Once again, the 
                                               
111 Parties in mutual weight loss commitments may have incentives to jointly defect from their 
commitments in the future. But the use of third-party referees can at times dampen this 
opportunism by independently verifying whether or not the individual commitments were kept. 
112 The bonds might further be conditioned on the government’s not passing the regulations.  
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commitment bonds device lowers the cost of credible commitment to a particular 
goal (in this case, reduced emissions), because of the payments received by each 
member of the group.  
The only difference this rationale has from the signaling rationale explored 
in Subsection II.C.2. is that a group of separate nongovernmental entities rather 
than a single governmental entity is entering into the commitment. If an entity is 
nothing but a nexus of contracts,113 this is a meaningless distinction. Nonetheless, 
there are some particular challenges to using commitment bonds to send a signal 
in this context. One is that it may be difficult to reach an agreement. When a 
single entity sells commitment bonds, it need not ordinarily decide which 
subentity would bear the cost of failure. With multiple legally distinct entities, an 
agreement must be made about how great a commitment each must make. This 
can be challenging, as each entity may argue for a lower commitment from itself. 
At the same time, the commitment bonds mechanism inherently alleviates the 
problem to some extent, because entities that make deeper commitments will 
receive larger upfront payments. The mechanism also alleviates the need for 
continued negotiation among the parties. After the commitments are entered into, 
each party has an incentive to lower its pollution, and we need not worry about 
internal conflicts among the entities in determining how self-regulation should 
proceed.  
An alternative to mutual commitment bonds is to have each of a number 
of a group make commitments to one another. For example, one might imagine a 
contract among a group of electricity users, with each user promising to pay the 
others some amount of money if the user fails to meet a conservation goal. In fact, 
a version of this mutual bond exists in the form of the Chicago Climate 
Exchange.114 An advantage mutual commitment bonds have over this approach is 
that they greatly reduce the risk of nonenforcement. Each member of a group may 
be hesitant to sue another member, for fear that it will itself be sued, and so there 
is a danger that all members of a group will tacitly agree to ignore a goal. This 
danger will be greater the more homogeneous the group is. Mutual commitment 
bonds grant the enforcement power to one or more third parties who have no 
reason to fear retaliation, and so the signal sent by the multiple entities will be 
more credible, and the incentives to meet the goal will be stronger. 
                                               
113 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, 
and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999). 
114 Companies that join the Chicago Climate Exchange commit to a 1% a year reduction in their 
greenhouse emissions, with the added incentive of gaining credits if they reduce their emissions by 
more. They can then sell those credits to other participants. And those who do not meet that 
reduction must buy permits. Companies voluntarily enter into this commitment, with the 
additional reward of good publicity. See Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Your Personal Climate 
Exchange, FORBES, Oct. 30, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/1124/148.html. 
 
 COMPENSATING COMMITMENTS   46 
 
 
Mutual commitment bonds also may be useful when it is not possible or 
practical to assign an individual goal for each member of a group, but possible to 
establish a collective goal. Suppose, for example, that a number of factories lie 
alongside a river, and it appears that at least one of these factories is polluting the 
river above legal limits. The government threatens to impose a much more 
stringent and expensive monitoring regime. The factories might agree to enter into 
a mutual commitment bond that would require each factory owner to pay a large 
fine if pollution exceeds a particular level, regardless of whether that factory 
owner can be proven responsible. If each factory agrees to pay for the entire 
liability of pollution, then each factory will have optimal deterrence incentives 
with respect to its own activities.115 Ordinarily, of course, it would be hard to 
convince the factories to agree to such an arrangement, but the prospect of 
receiving upfront payments might make the signaling incentive more attractive. 
Meanwhile, individual factories that are not engaging in excessive pollution might 
propose such an arrangement as a way of credibly signaling that they individually 
are not responsible and perhaps exposing those who refuse as the likely 
wrongdoers. Only firms expecting to bear the cost of changing their polluting 
activity would have a strong incentive to reject such a proposal. 
2. Unverifiable Conduct 
The factories example also helps illustrate a second situation in which 
mutual commitment bonds may be helpful: when individual actors engage in 
conduct that can benefit or harm other actors, but the legal system cannot easily 
identify such conduct. A similar example can illustrate how such a mutual 
commitment bond might be useful even in the absence of costs borne by anyone 
outside the group. Suppose that some fixed number of fishermen own a lake, but 
overfishing by one or more unknown fishermen is reducing collective welfare. 
Assume further that there are no simple mechanisms for detecting the identity of 
people overfishing, but that it is possible to accurately estimate the stock of fish 
remaining in the lake at the end of the season. The fishermen might agree to enter 
into mutual commitment bonds in which everyone will be required to pay an 
escalating amount of money to a third party as the stock of fish falls below some 
set level. This could be sufficient to deter each fisherman from exceeding its 
quota, because the profits from overfishing might be less than the payment in the 
event of failure to reach the collective goal.  
Mutual commitment bonds may analogously be used to encourage 
unverifiable investments that will benefit two or more individuals in a group. The 
problem of unverifiable investment is a staple of the literature on the economics 
                                               
115 See Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Total Liability for Excessive Harm, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 63 
(2007).  
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of contracts,116 which recognizes that contracts are often incomplete and that 
courts often will not be able to determine whether parties have acted well or 
badly. Perhaps the paradigmatic relationship in which it is difficult for courts to 
assess parties’ conduct is marriage. In marriage, each party may have suboptimal 
incentives to engage in activities benefiting the marriage (e.g., taking out the 
trash, buying small gifts for the partner), because each party receives only half the 
benefits of a strong marriage. Similarly, parties may have excessive incentives to 
engage in activities that harm the marriage: of two married individuals, the 
adulterer alone benefits from cheating, while both spouses will share the negative 
consequences.  
In principle, mutual commitment bonds can help solve this problem. A 
couple might agree to sell mutual commitment bonds that would require a 
payment to the bondholder in the event of divorce or separation. Such an 
approach in principle can increase the incentives of each party to a marriage to 
make the marriage work, as it would force each spouse to internalize more of the 
costs of marital failure. Some legal devices may achieve similar effects by 
imposing costs on divorcing parties—for example, by requiring parties to remain 
married for some period of time after initially seeking divorce117—but they offer 
couples no upfront benefit for entering into a commitment. This example is an 
application of Cooter and Porat’s insight that anti-insurance can help reduce 
moral hazard.118 Mutual commitment bonds, however, can be used whether or not 
the broader relationship is cemented by contract: individuals prohibited by law 
from marrying, for example, might be compensated in advance for entering into 
mutual commitment bonds that would require them to pay a third party if they 
cease living together. 
Of course, our purpose is not to insist that there is a significant market for 
mutual commitment bonds by married couples, but rather to illustrate how these 
bonds may be useful in any relationship in which an individual party may not 
fully internalize the costs and benefits of his, her, or its actions. For example, 
mutual commitment bonds could be useful in some contractual settings. Suppose 
that two contracting parties are to work together on some project. There may be a 
danger that each will work less than is optimal, especially if a court would not be 
able to identify who shirked in the event that the project is unsuccessful. A mutual 
commitment bond, promising to achieve some goal for the project as a whole, can 
help reduce shirking by giving each party a greater stake in project success. 
                                               
116 See generally Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 
ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, 67 
ECONOMETRICA 741 (1999). 
117 See, e.g., Louise Carriere, It's Deja Vu All Over Again: The Covenant Marriage Act in Popular 
Cultural Perception and Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1702, 1717-45 (1997-1998). 
118 See Cooter & Porat, supra note 6.  
 
 COMPENSATING COMMITMENTS   48 
 
 
3. Strategic Bargaining 
In both the group signaling and unverifiable conduct scenarios, the parties 
use mutual commitment bonds in a cooperative venture to avoid shirking. But 
mutual commitment bonds may also be useful when parties’ interests are directly 
adverse. Consider two parties that are disputing ownership of some property. 
They may have at least one interest in common: the interest in reducing 
bargaining costs. Entering into a mutual commitment bond can advance that 
common interest, and the agreement to the mutual bond need not be part of a 
contract resolving all or even any of their differences. For example, the parties 
might agree to a contract in which each promises to pay a third party some 
amount of money (say, $100,000) if they fail to reach some settlement about the 
property ownership. Once again, they could agree to such a contract in the 
absence of upfront payments, but the possibility of failure might then make such a 
commitment uneconomical. 
Such an agreement can reduce a party’s incentives to engage in strategic 
bargaining that might threaten an agreement. For example, sometimes it might 
make sense for a party in a negotiation to reject a reasonable offer and even 
terminate negotiations in an effort to try to convince the other party that it 
genuinely believes that its offer is unreasonable. Bluffing is a familiar tactic in 
negotiation by a party seeking to capture as much of the surplus of an agreement 
as possible. The danger is that sometimes, such tactics, especially when engaged 
in by both parties, may prevent the parties from reaching an agreement at all, or at 
least delay reaching an agreement. A party deciding whether to bluff must weigh 
the expected cost of bargaining failure against the expected additional surplus 
received. A mutual commitment bond increases the cost of bargaining failure, 
thus making it less likely that a party will engage in strategic bargaining behavior, 
or at least reducing the extent to which parties engage in such behavior. 
A simple numeric example can illustrate the virtues of mutual 
commitment bonds relative to other commitment devices. Suppose that A and B 
are negotiating over how to split $100,000. If they cannot reach an agreement, 
neither receives any money. Let us suppose that each estimates that by walking 
away from the table at a critical point in negotiations, there will be a 10% chance 
that the party will be able to receive $65,000 instead of $50,000, with a 2% 
increase in the chance of bargaining failure (i.e., 4% if both parties walk away). 
With these numbers, each party will have an incentive to walk away from the 
bargaining table. (The expected benefit of walking away, 0.10 * $15,000 = 
$1,500, is greater than the expected cost, 0.02 * $50,000 = $1,000.) The expected 
loss from strategic bargaining is 0.04 * $100,000 = $4,000. However, if the 
parties enter into a mutual commitment bond in which each must pay more than 
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$25,000 in the event that they fail to reach an agreement by the deadline, then 
neither will have an incentive to engage in strategic bargaining.  
As developed so far, it might appear that the parties could fare equally 
well by simply making a commitment to pay more than $25,000 each to a charity 
in the event that they fail to reach an agreement. Because this commitment would 
be a sufficient deterrent, they would never have to pay it, and the mutual 
commitment bond is overkill. But suppose that even with commitment, there is a 
significant residual chance of bargaining failure, say 10%. (Thus, if one party 
walks away, there is a 12% chance, and if both parties walk away, 14%.) In this 
case, the parties’ combined total expected payment to the charity would be equal 
to $5,000. This amount is greater than the $4,000 expected loss from strategic 
bargaining, and it would not be rational (philanthropic motivations aside) for the 
parties to make the commitment to the charity. But if the parties receive a 
combined $5,000, or even somewhat less, from a third party that purchases the 
mutual commitment bond, then the transaction will be mutually advantageous. 
Of course, in real world situations, each party will not have full 
information about the other party’s incentives. Strategic bargaining will often 
occur when each party is uncertain about how costly bargaining failure will be for 
the other. Each party seeks to demonstrate that it will not be harmed much by 
bargaining failure. This may make it hard to enter into negotiations to sell mutual 
commitment bonds. Nonetheless, it may sometimes be easier to enter into mutual 
commitment bonds (perhaps with each party putting at risk a different amount) 
than to resolve the underlying bargaining issue. Mutual commitment bonds are 
cheap in expected value terms because of the benefit to the parties in the event of 
success. It may also sometimes be feasible to enter into mutual commitment 
bonds well in advance of a negotiation, when strategic bargaining may be less 
likely.  
B. Applications 
Our examples of mutual commitment bonds so far have been mostly 
abstract, designed to illustrate how mutual commitment bonds can address a range 
of theoretical problems. In this section, we offer some more concrete applications. 
Our purpose, however, is not so much to advocate them; whether these proposals 
would be practical depends on a range of considerations beyond the scope of this 
Article. Rather, the purpose is to demonstrate simply how the possibility of 
mutual commitment bonds creates new possibilities for institutional 
arrangements. We will consider first a private context and then a governmental 
one.  
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1. Commitments among Private Parties 
We have already seen that mutual commitment bonds can be used to 
reduce the incidence of strategic bargaining in negotiations. Settlement 
discussions are a type of negotiation, and so mutual commitment bonds could be 
used to decrease strategic bargaining and increase the likelihood of settlement. 
For example, the parties could agree that if a case goes to trial, each party would 
pay a fixed amount of money to the purchaser of a commitment bond. As in any 
other negotiation, this would reduce the risk that a party would hold out to extract 
a relatively high proportion of the bargaining surplus. 119  
A principal challenge to reaching such an agreement is adverse 
selection.120 The danger is that parties who expect to have a good chance of 
settling their lawsuits will sell mutual commitment bonds, depressing the price 
that purchasers will pay. It may be difficult for third parties to estimate accurately 
the chance of legal settlement, especially when litigants selling mutual 
commitment bonds should be united in their desire to persuade third parties that 
settlement is relatively unlikely. Perhaps a third party can participate in some 
form of due diligence, scrutinizing the paperwork in both parties’ legal offices 
with their consent and with confidentiality assurances. Mutual commitment bonds 
may be most feasible when there is relatively little private information about 
litigation. But when there is relatively little private information, there will be 
relatively little asymmetric information between the parties, and the probability of 
settlement will be relatively high anyway. 
 Mutual commitment bonds thus may be a more useful mechanism for 
limiting litigation when agreed upon in advance, for example, as part of a system 
of arbitration. If the sale of mutual commitment bonds is mandatory in some 
arbitration setting, then the adverse selection problem is greatly mitigated.121 
Purchasers of mutual commitment bonds will still face uncertainty about how to 
value them, but they need not worry that the bonds are being sold only because 
the sellers know that they will have relatively little value. Arbitration systems 
sometimes use other mechanisms to encourage settlement; for example, final offer 
arbitration encourages settlement by giving parties incentives to reveal their 
                                               
119 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 175 (“Another 
impediment to settlement is the possibility that strategic bargaining may prevent the parties from 
reaching a compromise even though a bargaining range exists in which it would be advantageous 
for both to settle.”). 
120 Cf. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (discussing an analogous problem in the used car market). 
121 See, for example, Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 
697, 760 (2005); and Benjamin J. Richardson, Mandating Environmental Liability Insurance, 12 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 293, 312-13 (2002), for discussions on mitigating adverse selection 
by making purchases mandatory. 
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honest views of litigation prospects.122 Mutual commitment bonds could be a 
complement to or substitute for other mechanisms that arbitration systems use to 
reduce legal costs.  
 A problem with mandating the use of mutual commitment bonds in 
advance might be that it would be difficult to foresee the optimal size of the 
mutual commitment bond. The size presumably depends on the stakes in the 
litigation. For example, suppose that two parties are required to each sell 
$1,000,000 commitment bonds for litigation in which $1,000 is at stake. 
Litigation will almost certainly be averted, but the merits of the case will likely 
have little bearing on the settlement value. Factors such as which party can more 
easily sustain a loss of $1,000,000 are likely to be as or more important in driving 
settlement negotiations. Even if the claim is frivolous, it seems likely that many 
defendants would happily settle for $500 rather than risk paying $1,000,000. 
Because mutual commitment bonds can affect settlement dynamics, it is 
important for them to be set at levels that are neither too small to encourage 
settlement nor so large as to distort settlement. 
One possible solution would be for parties to agree to sell mutual 
commitment bonds where each party promises to pay to a third party an amount 
equal to the other party’s legal expenses.123 This would be useful in cases where a 
party in litigation may take some action, such as filing a discovery request, which 
is relatively cheap for it but relatively expensive for the opposing party. Parties 
may not take such actions if they expected to bear the cost of compliance with 
their request. With this approach to mutual commitment bonds, each party will 
expect to bear the full cost of litigation, including its own expenses and its 
opponents, and thus the full cost of any escalation of the litigation. Even with this 
approach, parties may spend too much from the parties’ joint perspective, because 
neither party will take into account that any advantage that it seeks to obtain for 
itself will come at the expense of the other party. But mutual commitment bonds 
should still help limit legal expenses and encourage settlement. 
With this variation, advance agreement to sell mutual commitment bonds 
is especially important. If one party is expected to bear less litigation expenses 
than the other, then it would be unlikely to agree to such an arrangement once 
litigation materializes. But even where legal costs are asymmetric, contracting 
parties might be able to reach an agreement on mutual commitment bonds as part 
of broader contract negotiations. From a social perspective, mutual commitment 
bonds that require each party to bear both parties’ litigation costs should be 
                                               
122 See, e.g., William F. Samuelson, Final-Offer Arbitration Under Incomplete Information, 37 J. 
MGMT. SCI. 1234 (1991).  
123 See John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, Or If Posner and Shavell Can't Remember 
the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1991) (observing that parties can 
contract around the default rules for paying fees). 
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especially welcomed, because this will reduce the possibility that asymmetric 
litigation costs will distort settlement values. That does not mean that it would be 
socially beneficial for a legislature to require all parties to issue mutual 
commitment bonds. The bonds may, for example, tend to disadvantage parties 
that are relatively risk-averse and relatively liquidity constrained. 
While parties may sometimes agree both to mutual commitment bonds and 
to some form of arbitration, advance agreement to mutual commitment bonds 
alone may have some advantages over agreement to arbitration alone. First, there 
is a danger that arbitration may tend to favor one party over other parties. A 
common criticism of arbitration, especially where mandated in form contracts, is 
that arbitrators may have some incentive to favor the party that has a greater 
ability to influence the contract in the future. Because mutual commitment bonds 
do not change the relevant legal decisionmakers, they may lead to less change in 
substantive outcomes. Second, a principal goal of arbitration is to lower legal 
costs, but this can be hard to achieve. Lowering the cost of trial (or completed 
arbitration), for example, increases the chance that parties will be willing to go to 
trial, offsetting any cost savings. The mutual commitment bonds approach seeks 
to reduce total legal costs by raising the parties’ ex post legal costs from 
continuing and escalating litigation. With the compensating payments from sale 
of the mutual commitment bonds, parties paradoxically should end up with lower 
legal costs. It is plausible that increasing the individual costs of litigation could 
reduce the total cost even without mutual commitment bonds, but the case is 
much stronger when the parties receive their expected increase in costs through 
payments from the bond purchaser. 
An agreement to sell mutual commitment bonds may also encourage 
litigating parties to agree to other forms of arbitration, even when they might not 
have been able to agree on arbitration initially. Often, it is difficult to generate an 
agreement to arbitration once a lawsuit materializes, because one party might be 
expected to benefit more than the other from arbitration. But roughly doubling 
legal fees will increase the incentives of parties to agree on means of lowering 
fees. Perhaps the party that would be relatively disadvantaged by arbitration might 
agree to it in exchange for some concession (for example, an agreement that any 
damages ultimately granted would be reduced or increased by a modest 
percentage). Short of arbitration, parties might negotiate agreements to reduce the 
cost of discovery.124 They might even agree by contract to implement some 
additional form of fee-shifting. 
                                               
124 Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 469-72 (2007).  
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2. Commitments among Governments 
If governments can use commitment bonds to make commitments in much 
the same way as any single entity, so too can two or more governments agree to 
enter into mutual commitment bonds as a way of enforcing their agreements to 
one another. For example, commitment bonds could serve as a remedial 
mechanism for violations of bilateral or multilateral accords. For example, 
governments could use mutual commitment bonds as a mechanism to police trade 
disputes. Suppose that Countries A and B have entered into a bilateral tariff-
reduction agreement. The countries could agree that each will auction 
commitment bonds, with payoffs equal to some multiple of the damages suffered 
by the other country in the event of a violation of the agreement.125 Importantly, 
the countries would need to agree on the forum in which disputes would be 
adjudicated; for example, a neutral country or an international organization such 
as the WTO might decide disputes. There may be some danger that a country 
would simply ignore the decision of the adjudicator, but the fact that this would 
undermine the nation’s ability to enter into commitments with commitment bonds 
in the future may make this less likely. Requiring each country to place 
substantial assets in escrow could also eliminate the concern about 
noncompliance. 
What is most distinctive about this approach is that complaints would be 
brought by the third party bondholders rather than by the offended state. There are 
potential advantages and disadvantages to this. An advantage is that there is less 
risk of trade violations causing international friction. Of course, a wronged state 
might still complain about violations of treaty obligations, but because it would 
have no direct role in the enforcement process, it would be easier for each country 
to offer a muted official response.126 
The use of commitment bonds would also represent a change in the 
remedy for trade violations. Under current WTO procedures, a country whose 
trade rights have been violated is permitted to retaliate against the offending 
state.127 Critics have argued that the remedy aggravates the original offense, 
                                               
125 For example, say the United States and France were to enter into a trade agreement involving 
the auction of commitment bonds, with both committing to pay treble damages in the event of 
violation. Then if the United States were to enact protective tariffs in violation of that agreement 
and caused $100 million in damages, the United States would owe bondholders $300 million. 
126 A disadvantage is that there is some risk of overenforcement, though again fee-shifting or other 
similar devices can reduce this concern. Moreover, overenforcement may be preferable to a 
regime in which each country is hesitant to act against violations of its trade rights for fear that 
another country will charge it with violations as well. Commitment bonds reduce the risk that each 
of two countries will tolerate a reversion to protectionism by the other, in the face of common 
domestic pressures  
127 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Art. 22.2, 
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leading to reduced trade.128 Defending the approach, Jide Nzelibe has argued that 
the mechanism cleverly takes advantage of the domestic political power of 
protectionist interests in the wronged state and of exporters in the offending state 
to ensure that trade rights will be enforced and that violators will yield to the 
adjudicator.129  
Mutual commitment bonds should make money damages more attractive, 
however. Ordinarily, a country may be hesitant to enter into a treaty regime in 
which it might need to pay money damages. Legislators may focus more on 
bottom-line budget numbers than on social welfare, and so they may be more 
willing to tolerate trade retaliation against domestic industry than an equivalent 
fine. (Of course, this also suggests that monetary damages can have stronger 
deterrent properties.) The upfront payment that each country should receive from 
selling mutual commitment bonds may balance the concern about making a later 
payment in the event of a trade violation. This is especially likely to make a 
difference if legislators have high or even hyperbolic discount rates,130 embracing 
an immediate infusion into the treasury even when accompanied by a 
commitment in the future that is likely to be somewhat greater in expected value 
terms. 
As each nation would issue its own bonds, these general considerations 
can be extended easily to multilateral disputes as well as to disputes in areas other 
than trade. Conceivably, two nations engaged in physical hostilities might seek to 
use mutual commitment bonds to enforce a peace accord. Whatever the merits of 
nations enforcing their treaty rights through trade retaliation, alternatives to 
military retaliation could be beneficial. A country might be more willing to resist 
a military response to a perceived violation of an agreement if it knew that third 
party bondholders would extract a monetary payment. And countries may be more 
willing to enter into peace accords in the first place if they know that meeting 
their obligations will provide a financial windfall. Of course, all this depends on 
warring nations’ being able to commit sufficiently well to paying bondholders, 
which may be impractical for states with limited resources to place in escrow and 
no history of commitment to the rule of law.131  
                                                                                                                                
WTO Agreement, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). 
128 Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants (2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with authors). 
129 Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the World 
Trade Organization's Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 215 (2005). 
130 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
131For instance, Worldwide Governance Indicators has measured rule of law worldwide. See 
Governance Matters 2009, WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS, 1996-2008 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/worldmap.asp  
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CONCLUSION 
This article has sketched a dizzying array of contexts in which committing 
parties could seek ex ante compensation for taking on a potential risk of making 
ex post payments if they fail to live up to their commitments. What is more, we 
have identified a family of incentive-equivalent structures, which vary the timing 
of contingent and non-contingent cash flows in order to implement these 
commitments. While the idea of uncompensated commitment devices has been 
well-understood for decades, the simple but powerful enhancement of fair-bet 
compensation holds the prospect of substantially reducing the cost of making 
commitments.  
Our goal has not been to provide the nitty-gritty details of implementation, 
but instead, to provoke a sense of the scope and potential for helping individuals, 
entities, and even nation states to better achieve their goals. But for those who are 
skeptical that commitment compensation could never work in practice, we end 
with this motivating example of what may have been the world’s first ex ante 
implementation of a compensating commitment bond. 
On February 22, 2008, James Hurman, a thirty-year-old New Zealander, 
posted a short video on YouTube offering to “hand over my right to smoke,” 
promising to pay the highest bidder NZ$1,000 “per cigarette that I smoke at any 
time following the auction’s closure.”132 We have described the ex ante auction as 
selling to the highest bidder the right to be the recipient of any forfeiture 
payments. But in another sense, James was indeed selling his “right to smoke.” 
Before signing the contract, he had an unfettered right to smoke whenever he 
wanted. And smoke he did. He estimates that he had smoked 50,000 cigarettes 
before he entered this contract.  
On March 31, 2008, James signed his commitment contract with Kent 
Pearson. Kent had won the auction for a mere NZ$300.133 James has been under 
the contract for over a year. His wife had their first baby, Tripp Sander Hurman, 
                                               
132 A longer description of Hurman’s auction story will appear in IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND 
STICKS ch. 3 at 61 (forthcoming 2010); see also Smoking Habit for Sale, 
http://smokinghabitforsale.com/index.html (last visited June 15, 2009); Smoking Habit Contract, 
trademe.co.nz (last visited June 15, 2009), 
http://www.trademe.co.nz/Browse/Listing.aspx?id=146646769. Hurman promised to donate the 
proceeds from the auction to the Cancer Society of New Zealand. 
133 The auction revenue could be low for two radically different reasons. Bidders could have been 
convinced that the commitment to pay $20,000 a pack assured a very low chance that James 
would ever fail. See supra text accompanying note 22. Or, bidders could have figured that they 
would never be able to collect from James even if he did continue to smoke. This auction was the 
first of its kind – with attendant risks of whether courts in New Zealand would even enforce a 
severe forfeiture. But the very existence of this example shows that an ex ante auction can produce 
bids and at least some compensation for taking on the risk of forfeiture. 
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on July 21, 2009, and, as of this writing, James has been smoke-free ever since. 
For those who think that a commitment compensation auction could never work 
in practice, one answer is that it already has.134 And if it can work for a man, why 
not for other private parties or even for governments? 
                                               
134 A version of the wager approach to commitment bonds has also been implemented in England, 
where the betting agency William Hill takes weight-loss wagers. See Nicholas Burger & John 
Lynham, Betting on Weight Loss . . . and Losing: Personal Gambles as Commitment Mechanisms, 
16 APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS 1350 (2009); AYRES, supra note 23. For example, Graham Trow 
won a bet that he couldn’t lose 28 pounds in 56 days, where he initially paid in $68, and ended up 
receiving $1,900 for his efforts. Even though competing offers from other bookmakers could 
emulate the outcomes of the auction, the economists Burger and Lynham find the contracted odds 
made the bets less than fair to people attempting to lose weight.  
